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Preface
In recent years an overwhelming experimental and empirical evidence has put mounting pres-
sure on the economic paradigm that individuals should be modelled as exclusively interested
in their own material well-being. By now many economists would agree that apart from mon-
etary concerns individuals may also be driven by altruism, reciprocity, a desire for equal or
fair distributions of resources, or status considerations. This has prompted the development
of numerous theories aiming at a better understanding of individual conduct. Appreciation
for these new psychological approaches has cumulated in the award of the 2003 Nobel price
to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith. Behavioral and experimental economics have thus
reached the mainstream. At the same time the theory of incentives has been continuously
deepening our understanding of contracts and institutions battling the unfavorable effects
of asymmetric information. However, only relatively few theoretical models investigate the
impact of psychology on incentives and the design of institutions. The present thesis adds to
this literature by looking at the interaction of a particular behavioral trait, inequity aversion,
with asymmetric information and incentives in the context of bilateral trade of a customized
good, employment decisions and contracts, and team incentives.
The theory of inequity aversion developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) has attracted enor-
mous attention. The authors essentially assume that although most individuals are ‘selfish’
and only care for their own payoff, at least some individuals are ‘inequity averse’ and suffer a
utility loss if their payoff is not equal to the payoffs of the other individuals in their reference
group. Moreover, individuals differ with respect to their concerns for equity and individ-
ual preferences are private information. Yet apart from adding some realism to economic
modelling, will Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have a lasting impact on economics? Moreover,
should their theory of inequity aversion be adopted and incorporated into economic models?
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Whereas only time can respond to the first, there are criteria to be met for an affirmative an-
swer to the second question. Economics is an empirical social science. A new theory should
thus be adopted if and only if it better explains the empirical evidence than the existing
theories. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) pass this test as the generated predictions are consistent
with an almost surprisingly large number of different experiments. This stems from a subtle
influence of the strategic environment on the consequences of inequity aversion.
Inequity averse individuals want to reduce inequity. If benefits exceed costs, an inequity
averse individual is thus willing to sacrifice some of his payoff in order to help another indi-
vidual with a lower payoff. Yet if another individual gets a higher payoff, an inequity averse
individual may be willing to take costly actions if this decreases the other’s payoff by even
more. Finally, if an inequity averse individual can hardly influence the overall inequality
of the payoff distribution, the best he can do is maximize his own payoff. Inequity averse
individuals can thus exhibit altruistic, envious or selfish behavior. Specifically, inequity aver-
sion is consistent with the empirical evidence on experiments concerning competition and
markets. As summarized by Smith (1982) and Davis and Holt (1993) markets tend to work
astonishingly well under even the most adverse conditions. For a long time these experiments
were seen as support for the assumption of rational, purely self-interested individuals. Yet
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can also explain this empirical evidence while providing a better fit
to experiments refuting the self-interest hypothesis. Thanks to the above characterized de-
pendency on the strategic environment, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) qualifies for an interesting
methodological augmentation of microeconomic theory.
As part of the strategic situation asymmetric information can strongly influence and amplify
the effect of inequity aversion. For example, inequity averse and selfish individuals might
contribute to the provision of a public good if and only if there are some inequity averse
individuals around willing to inflict costly punishments on free-riders.1 If preferences are not
observable, the suspicion that some individuals might be inequity averse can be sufficient to
sustain cooperation in a group actually consisting only of selfish individuals. Such an interac-
tion of inequity aversion and asymmetric information is especially interesting as the latter is
often prevalent in situations in which inequity aversion should have the largest impact. Asym-
1See Fehr and Gächter (2000) for an experimental investigation.
v
metric information can give individuals some - possibly undesirable - freedom of action which
they can use to ‘get even’. However, even absent inequity aversion asymmetric information
and diverging interests can generate efficiency losses. The corresponding contractual reme-
dies are investigated by the theory of incentives. Together with the development of highly
powerful theoretical tools, this has generated profound insights into the functioning and in-
ternal organization of institutions. Yet as frequently noted by Ernst Fehr, Klaus Schmidt,
and their co-authors, the application of inequity aversion promises to be especially fruitful if
individual decisions - for example effort choices or the revelation of important information -
have a strong impact on payoff distributions. The present thesis takes up this point of view
and explores the interaction of inequity aversion with asymmetric information and incentives.
Chapter 1 investigates the impact of inequity aversion on the efficiency of incomplete con-
tracts. The model is set in the context of the famous hold-up problem pioneered by Grout
(1982), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990). Consider a buyer and a
seller who can trade some good. The good has been customized by costly relation-specific
investments of the traders so that gains of trade are especially high if that particular buyer
trades with that particular seller. If the trade contract signed by buyer and seller is incom-
plete and therefore leaves important contractual details unspecified, both traders will try to
exploit this leeway by bargaining over terms of trade after the relation-specific investments
are sunk. Anticipating this buyer and seller know that they will get only part of the pro-
ceeds from their investments but incur all individual investment costs. This impairs ex ante
incentives to maximize gains from trade, which constitutes the hold-up problem. However,
although most contracts are highly incomplete in reality, bilateral trade is often accomplished
in a reasonably efficient way. This contradicts the theory of incentives.
As the anticipated bargaining outcome determines investment incentives, bargaining plays a
crucial role in the hold-up problem. Since bargaining is also important in many other areas, it
has been subjected to numerous experimental tests. Indeed, the ‘ultimatum game’ is probably
the best known experiment in economics. However, the empirical results summarized by
Güth, Schmittberger, and Tietz (1990), Kagel and Roth (1995) or Camerer and Thaler
(1997) strongly refute the self-interest hypothesis and call for an inclusion of psychology into
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economics. Yet if bargaining outcomes are affected by the psychological characteristics of the
negotiants, these characteristics influence investment decisions in the hold-up problem.
Consequently, Chapter 1 is based on the assumption that individuals might be inequity averse
and - equally important - individual preferences are unobservable. Inequity averse individu-
als prefer a bargaining breakdown as compared to trade at inequitable, unfair conditions. If
preferences are observable, their opponents account for this and inequity averse individuals
ultimately get a better deal than a selfish individual. This improves the formers’ investment
incentives, but as long as they do not have all the bargaining power even inequity averse
individuals do not reap all proceeds from their investment and thus invest inefficiently little.
Moreover, the insufficient investment incentives of selfish individuals are not affected.
If preferences are private information, the effect of inequity aversion changes. If a trader is
sufficiently convinced that his bargaining opponent is inequity averse, he behaves as if the
opponent was inequity averse. Appearing to be inequity averse is thus sufficient to increase
a trader’s bargaining power, and inequity aversion can affect investment incentives for selfish
and inequity averse traders. Additionally, bargaining in the hold-up problem is preceded by
the individuals’ relation-specific investments. If preferences are private information, these in-
vestments can be a signalling device. Chapter 1 determines the conditions under which there
exists a pooling equilibrium in which both inequity averse and selfish traders invest efficiently
in order not to appear selfish and thus loose bargaining power in the ensuing bargaining. In-
equity aversion and asymmetric information about preferences might therefore explain why
in reality trade is often accomplished efficiently even though contracts are incomplete.
Whereas Chapter 1 looks at bilateral trade, Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the influence
of inequity aversion on employment decisions, wage schemes, and the organization of the
firm. Although involuntary unemployment is one of the most important economic problems,
economists still have a hard time trying to explain why wages do not adjust as to equate
supply and demand in the labor market. Blinder and Choi (1990), Bewley (1995), Campbell
and Kamlani (1997), and Bewley (1999) investigate what determines a firm’s employment
decisions. They find that employers believe that remuneration schemes deteriorate working
morale if workers perceive them as unfair. Thus, employers try to avoid ‘unfair’ behavior,
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especially treating people in similar occupations differently by paying them very different
wages. This nicely fits the empirical observation that wages are often compressed as com-
pared to differences in productivity. Moreover, the business literature on ‘organizational
behavior’ has collected a multitude of case studies and empirical investigations suggesting
that fairness considerations matter at the workplace.2 Yet, if cooperation amongst workers,
and if the workers’ relationship with their employers is influenced by social comparisons,
then firms should account for this in their employment decisions, wage schemes, and internal
organization.
Chapter 2 studies a single firm’s optimal employment decision and optimal employment
contracts if workers are inequity averse. Further, it investigates the interaction of inequity
aversion with incomplete information about the workers’ productivity. It turns out that the
impact of inequity aversion delicately depends on what workers compare.
If workers compare only their income, inequity aversion causes an income compression and -
possibly - an exclusion of low-skilled workers. Employed workers differing in their productivity
are usually given different income levels. If the firm wants to employ the workers with the
initially lower income, these workers have to be compensated for their suffering. These
additional costs can only be reduced by reducing the income differences. Inequity aversion
thus compresses income levels. Moreover, adjusting employment contracts to the reduced
income differences creates distortions affecting the entire workforce. If these distortions are
sufficiently high, the firm might decide not to employ low-skilled workers. Inequity aversion
therefore offers an explanation for an unwillingness of firms to employ low-skilled workers.
Note that the above argument hinges on initial differences in income reflecting the workers’
differences in productivity. As this is independent of whether productivity is observable
or not, so is the impact of inequity aversion on employment decisions and contracts. The
findings are consistent with the existing theoretical literature incorporating fairness concerns
and social comparisons into the labor market, most notably Akerlof (1982), Frank (1984a),
Frank (1984b), Akerlof and Yellen (1988), and Akerlof and Yellen (1990).
2See Rotemberg (2002) for a survey on this literature.
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However, Chapter 2 continues to show that the above characterized consequences of inequity
aversion are reduced or even reversed if workers start to incorporate production costs in
their comparisons. Suppose workers perfectly account for production costs and compare
rents defined as income minus production costs. Contrary to the above argument asymmet-
ric information then interacts strongly with inequity aversion. If the firm can observe its
prospective workers’ productivity, it extracts all rents. Since thus all workers get an even
rent of zero, inequity aversion is irrelevant. However, if each worker’s productivity is pri-
vate information, workers with high productivity must get an informational rent to induce
truthful revelation of their type. Asymmetric information thus generates a rent inequality
which causes additional costs if all types of workers are to be employed. The rent inequality
can only be reduced by lowering the informational rent of the highly productive workers. As
this informational rent depends on what a highly productive worker can get by pretending
to be less productive, production of the less productive workers must be lowered. Since these
workers then incur lower production costs, the firm may reduce their income by more than
the decrease in the informational rent of the highly skilled workforce. Inequity aversion thus
increases income differences. Moreover, the impact of inequity aversion can be made arbi-
trarily small while at the same time diminishing the distortions imposed on highly productive
workers. Eventually the increase in profit from production of the less productive workers ex-
ceeds the costs of asymmetric information and inequity aversion. Hence, it is always optimal
to keep the low-skilled workers in the firm. These results stand in a stark contrast to the
impact of inequity aversion if workers compare only income, and thus contradict the existing
theoretical literature cited above.
In Chapter 2 inequity aversion influences a worker’s decision whether to accept a certain
employment contract. However, once employed the worker must produce a certain quantity
and has no leeway to align his actions with his fairness concerns. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
indicate that inequity aversion has a larger impact if individuals can ‘get even’ on their own
account, for example by reducing their unobservable effort provision in a problem of moral
hazard. Consequently, Chapter 3 explores incentive provision in teams if each team member’s
effort choice is not verifiable and individuals are inequity averse.
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Very broadly speaking a team can be defined as a group of individuals whose individual
payoffs are tied to the group’s joint performance. Teams can emerge in many different sit-
uations, for example a firm collectively owned by its workers, or a group of employees in a
large public company using team remuneration schemes. In any case, if the team’s output
depends on its members’ effort contributions and individual effort choices are not observable
- and thus cannot be sanctioned individually - some individuals might try to free-ride on
the effort provision of the others. This can severely impair incentives to contribute effort or
cooperate. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmström (1982) show that the contractual
counter-measures influence the organization of the firm. However, the use of teams with
comparatively simple contracts is more widely spread and successful as to be expected from
the contract theoretical literature ensuing the above seminal articles.
Inequity aversion might offer an explanation. If individuals within a team compare their
payoff with the payoffs of the other team members, this can have a positive or a negative
effect on cooperation. If all the others provide effort, an individual might also contribute ef-
fort although the increase in his monetary payoff does not cover the effort costs. The reason
for this is that he dislikes getting more than the others, but this is exactly what happens
when he cheats the team by shirking. Effort provision may thus be facilitated. However, an
inequity averse individual strongly resents the others free-riding on his own effort provision.
He might thus decide not to work if all the other team members shirk although the increase in
his monetary payoff would then exceed his effort costs. Social comparisons can consequently
aggravate incentive provision.
Which effect prevails depends on the contracts connecting each individual’s payment scheme
to the joint performance of the group. Chapter 3 derives the optimal contracts accounting for
inequity aversion within a team of any size. It turns out that if agents are sufficiently inequity
averse, efficient effort choices can be implemented with relatively simple, budget-balancing
sharing rules. Building upon this result, the consequences of inequity aversion can be further
analyzed.
First, if the individual impact on joint performance decreases with team size whereas effort
costs remain constant, free-riding becomes generally more attractive the larger the team.
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What prevents individuals from shirking is the behavioral trait of shame from cheating. If
team size increases, more people are cheated but each individual counts less in the compar-
isons. Consequently shame from cheating stays constant, and cooperation becomes harder to
sustain with increasing team size. This fits the common observation that small teams often
work well whereas larger ones suffer from free-riding.
Second, even though inequity aversion reduces the free-rider effect restricting firm size, it can
have a negative impact on the optimal size of worker-owned firms. If a new inequity averse
worker is employed in a worker-owner firm, he compares himself with the incumbent owners.
In order to ensure participation he must receive a fair share of the joint profit in excess of
his effort costs. If a firm is owned by an outsider not incorporated in the team members’
comparisons, he can extract all rents without causing inequality. A new worker then accepts
an employment contract granting him zero rent. Thus, a worker-owned firm has compara-
tively higher costs of employing an additional worker. Chapter 3 investigates this argument
and presents a simple example in which inequity aversion prevents the efficient hiring of an
additional worker. Summarizing, the tools developed in Chapter 3 may be helpful to further
increase our understanding of the internal organization of the firm. If working in a team has
a psychological impact on incentives and effort provision, this should be accounted for by
firms when deciding on the composition and size of teams, divisions, and hierarchies.
Chapter 1
Incomplete Contracts
and the Hold-Up Problem
“Almost every economist would agree that actual
contracts are or appear quite incomplete.”
Tirole (1999), page 741.
1.1 Introduction
The study of incentive problems caused by asymmetric information has generated important
and interesting insights into the functioning of institutions. As one of the main conclusions
contracts designed to minimize efficiency losses should be ‘complete’ in the sense of using
all relevant and contractible information.1 According to this definition contracts in the real
world are often highly incomplete. Surprisingly these incomplete contracts work reasonably
well. Does this observation contradict incentive theory? The present paper argues that the
answer to this question is ‘No’ if social preferences and - equally important - incomplete
information about an individual’s preferences are taken into account. If preferences are un-
observable and information about the latter influences strategic behavior, individuals might
optimally choose certain - efficient - actions in order not to reveal unfavorable information.
However, adding asymmetric information can generate new inefficiencies.
1See, for example, Holmström (1982) or Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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The hold-up problem - first developed by Grout (1982), Grossman and Hart (1986), and
Hart and Moore (1990) - is the traditional tool for investigating the efficiency of incomplete
contracts. In a simplified version consider a buyer and a seller who can trade one unit of a
good. The good’s quality is determined by a costly investment of the seller. This investment
is relation-specific and increases only this particular buyer’s value from purchasing the good.
Suppose the contract governing the traders’ relationship is incomplete so that the buyer can
renegotiate terms of trade once the seller has sunk his investment. The seller knows that the
buyer will exploit the situation and thus anticipates that he cannot reap all proceeds from
his investment. Consequently he reduces his effort and provides a good of inefficiently low
quality. This constitutes the hold-up problem. However, in reality incomplete contracts do
not always have such inefficient consequences: the buyer often pays the promised price, and
trusting in this the seller provides good quality.
The present paper offers an explanation based on the following three assumptions. First,
individuals differ in some characteristics affecting their bargaining behavior. Second, these
heterogeneous characteristics are unobservable. And thirdly, individuals are aware of the
above and account for it when determining their own bargaining behavior.
All three assumptions are confirmed by numerous experiments investigating simple bargain-
ing games, and they form the basic ingredients of an enormous and influential literature on
bargaining under incomplete information including such pioneering articles include Crawford
(1982) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). Yet the most prominent bargaining experiment, the
famous ‘ultimatum game’, has received enormous attention for an additional reason. Apart
from providing supplementary empirical evidence for the above assumption, it seems to refute
the standard economic paradigm that all individuals exclusively care for their own payoff.2
Amongst other experiments the ultimatum game has thus prompted the development of a
new branch of economics. The associated theories, termed behavioral economics in a broader
context, aim at a better understanding of the motivations underlying individual conduct.
The present paper directly draws upon this literature for motivating the heterogeneity in the
traders’ bargaining behavior.
2See Güth, Schmittberger, and Tietz (1990).
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Amongst the emerging plethora of models in behavioral economics3, the theory of inequity
aversion developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is one of the most successful exponents. In
their very simple and applicable model these authors argue that although most individuals
are ‘selfish’ and exclusively interested in their own payoff, some individuals are ‘inequity
averse’ and also care for the equality of payoff distributions. Combined with private infor-
mation about these preferences, the impact of their theory on individual behavior depends
delicately on the strategic environment. Hence, the empirical predictions of their theory fit
the empirical evidence of a wide class of experiments surprisingly well.
The present paper invokes Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in order to model the traders’ bargain-
ing behavior in the hold-up problem. There are the following results. Inequity averse sellers
reject proposals that result in inequitable distributions. As they do so even if this causes
a bargaining breakdown they bargain more aggressively than selfish sellers. If preferences
are observable, the other negotiant - in the present model the buyer - accounts for this and
inequity averse sellers get a higher share of the trade surplus. Thus, they have better invest-
ment incentives. Yet since not even inequity averse sellers get the entire trade surplus they
still under-invest. Investment incentives for selfish sellers are unchanged.
However, the key argument of the model stems from an interaction of inequity aversion and
incomplete information about an individual’s preferences. If preferences are unobservable,
the implications of inequity aversion change. Since in the hold-up problem bargaining is
preceded by the investment, the latter might signal the seller’s preferences. Depending on
the considered perfect Bayesian equilibrium both inequity averse and selfish sellers might
optimally choose a certain investment in order not to ‘reveal’ unfavorable information about
their preferences harming them in the ensuing bargaining. If the efficient investment can be
supported as the equilibrium choice in such a pooling equilibrium, investment incentives are
efficient for both types. Yet, signalling is no cheap talk in the model, and amongst other,
highly inefficient perfect Bayesian equilibria there also exist separating equilibria.
Even though no scientific argument, the idea of the model is nicely illustrated by the following
little anecdote from the author’s personal experience. After moving into his new house, a
3For a survey of recent developments see Fehr and Schmidt (2003).
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buyer commissioned a mason to embellish his entrance area. Since work was mostly carried
out on Sundays and this is usually illicit in Germany, there was probably no legal contract so
that taxes can be avoided. After the entrance had been completed the buyer refused to pay
anything.4 As the mason had no possibility to take legal action without revealing the illegal
nature of his work, the story so far is in nice accordance with the standard hold-up problem.
However, the mason’s reaction is note-worthy and fits well into the present model. During
a particulary dark night he emptied buckets full of concrete on the newly paved doorsteps.
This criminal act was clearly costly even ignoring the risk of potential legal consequences.
Thus, his behavior confirms that some people react strongly whenever they feel cheated. Yet,
even more interesting than the story itself is how it was spread. The mason in person cir-
culated the news amongst his colleagues and customers. Perhaps he tried to build up some
reputation for being a ‘tough’ guy, but this in turn would suggest that individuals have a
strategic interest in transmitting certain information about their type.
Several other paper look at the impact of incomplete information or social preferences on
the efficiency of incomplete contracts. Gul (2001) investigates the hold-up problem if the
buyer’s investment and thus his valuation is private information. Moreover, the seller makes
all offers in a bargaining game with infinite horizon. By an argument similar to the Coase
conjecture, the buyer invests efficiently and the good is traded immediately if time between
offers converges to zero. However, inefficiencies disappear only in the limit, and psychology
or inequity aversion play no role.
The following articles are more closely related in as far as they analyze the interaction of
inequity aversion and incomplete contracts. Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and Fehr, Klein, and
Schmidt (2001) argue that since complete contracts restrict reciprocal behavior they might
crowd out reciprocal incentives. In Englmaier and Wambach (2003) the agent compares him-
self with the principal in a moral hazard problem. As concerns for inequity become infinitely
important, output must be divided equally independently of other informative signals. Con-
tracts are thus rendered incomplete. Nevertheless, none of these articles studies inequity
aversion in the context of the hold-up problem, and there is no bargaining or signalling.
4No, the author is not the buyer.
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Finally, the following authors consider the interaction of social preferences and the hold-
up problem. Carmichael and MacLeod (2003) start off by investigating the evolution of
bargaining conventions and social preferences with the help of the hold-up problem. Yet, in
their model sunk costs directly influence bargaining outcomes and preferences are observable.
Asymmetric information, however, lies at the heart of Ellingsen and Johannesson (2002b). In
their model unobservable investment costs combined with inequity aversion can generate in-
efficiencies, thus worsening the hold-up problem. The same authors demonstrate in Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2002a) that instead of aggravating incentive problems, fairness can improve
the situation by providing a focal point for the division of the trade surplus, thus diminish-
ing coordination failures during the bargaining. Last but not least, Fehr, Kremhelmer, and
Schmidt (2003) look at the impact of inequity aversion on the optimal allocation of ownership
rights. However, none of the above models captures the idea that investments might signal
a trader’s preferences, and that traders might invest efficiently in order not to appear to be
selfish and thus loose bargaining power in the ensuing division of the trade surplus.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the basic model, introduces inequity
aversion, characterizes the bargaining game and sequence of actions, and defines the efficient
investment. Section 1.3 describes the main results. First, it shows that a complete contract
can achieve efficiency. It then analyzes the optimal bargaining behavior of buyer and seller in
any perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Next it explains the impact of the equilibrium refinements
‘equilibrium dominance’ and ‘intuitive criterion’ on the set of possible pure strategy perfect
Bayesian equilibria. The following subsection demonstrates the existence of pooling equilibria
and elaborates on the impact of incomplete information by investigating the unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium if the seller’s preferences are observable. Section 1.3 closes by studying
the set of existing separating equilibria thus showing that the signalling game allows for a
separation of types and signalling is no cheap talk. Section 1.4 summarizes the results.
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1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Investment, Bargaining, and Sequence of Actions
Consider a buyer and a seller who can trade one unit of a good. The good’s quality is
determined by a costly investment of the seller. The ensuing model analyzes the seller’s
investment incentives if final terms of trade are not characterized in a trade contract but
instead determined by bargaining after investment costs have been sunk. In order to study
the interaction of investment and bargaining, the bargaining process is modeled explicitly as
a two-stage alternating-offer bargaining game. Together with the investment stage the model
consists of three periods.
Period 1: The seller chooses the quality i of the good. Producing a good of quality i ∈ [0,∞[
causes the seller investment costs i. The buyer makes no investment.
Period 2: The seller starts the bargaining by proposing - and thus claiming - a share s1 of
the trade surplus. The trade surplus characterized below depends on the seller’s prior invest-
ment. The buyer may accept or reject the seller’s offer. If he accepts, the good is traded,
the seller receives the share s1 of the trade surplus, and the buyer consumes the good. If the
buyer rejects s1, the good is not traded and buyer and seller proceed to the next period.
Period 3: The buyer proposes a share s2 of the trade surplus to be given to the seller. The
seller may accept or reject. If he accepts, the good is traded, the seller receives the share s2
of the trade surplus, and the buyer consumes the good. If the seller rejects s2, bargaining
breaks down and the seller consumes the good himself.
1.2.2 Buyer’s and Seller’s Preferences
Let φ(i) denote the buyer’s value from purchasing the good, and let ψ(i) denote the seller’s
value from consuming the good himself. Alternatively ψ(i) may be regarded as the price the
seller receives when selling the good at an external market and not to the buyer. Moreover,
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Assumption 1.1
1. φ and ψ are differentiable and strictly increasing in i.
2. φ and ψ are strictly concave, and φ′′(i) ≥ ψ′′(i) for all i.
3. φ(0) = ψ(0) = 0 and φ(i) > ψ(i) for all i > 0.
4. ψ′(0) > 1/δ and limi→∞φ′(i) < 1.
5. φ′(i) ≥ ψ′(i) and for all i.
Part 1 and 2 of the above assumption render all maximization problems well behaved. As
seen at a later stage, this requires φ′′(i) ≥ ψ′′(i) to guarantee the concavity of the seller’s
objective functions which can depend negatively on the trade surplus φ(i)−ψ(i). Part 3 cap-
tures the idea that the seller’s investment is relation-specific. Trading the good generates a
positive trade surplus φ(i)−ψ(i) which is lost if the seller consumes the good himself. Part 4
implies that most maximization problems have strictly positive solutions. The parameter
δ ∈]0, 1[ is a discount factor introduced below to capture costs of bargaining. Finally, Part 5
epitomizes the hold-up problem. According to the notion of efficiency defined below a seller
chooses an inefficiently low investment unless he receives the entire trade surplus.
The payoffs of buyer and seller are defined as follows. If there is trade, denote by s the
share of the trade surplus φ(i)− ψ(i) the seller receives in excess of his outside option ψ(i).
There are no restrictions on s which can thus characterize any terms of trade. The buyer’s
preferences are defined as follows.
Assumption 1.2 Consider a good of quality i. If the good is traded and the seller receives
share s of the trade surplus, the utility of the buyer is given by
v(i, s) := (1− s) [φ(i)− ψ(i)].
If the good is not traded, the buyer receives a utility normalized at zero.
The buyer’s utility exclusively depends on whether the good is traded, and if yes, according
to what terms of trade.
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Concerning the seller this paper invokes Fehr and Schmidt (1999). According to their theory
of inequity aversion some individuals care for relative payoffs. However, as a key element of
their model they assume that individuals have heterogeneous preferences and that individual
preferences are unobservable. In the present model this is captured by the assumption that
the seller can be of two types. There is an inequity averse seller who compares himself
with the buyer whenever the good is traded, and there is a selfish seller who is exclusively
interested in his own well-being. More precisely,
Assumption 1.3 Consider a good of quality i. If the good is traded and the seller receives
share s of the trade surplus, the utility of the selfish seller is given by
us(i, s) := s [φ(i)− ψ(i)] + ψ(i),
whereas the utility of the inequity averse seller is given by
ua(i, s) := us(i, s)− α max[(1− 2s)(φ(i)− ψ(i)), 0]
with α > 0. If the seller consumes the good, his utility is ψ(i) independent of his type.
The subindices s and a stand for selfish and inequity averse, correspondingly. Preferences
are unobservable but the commonly known prior probability for a seller to be inequity averse
is π ∈]0, 1[. The precise functional form (linearity and kink) is taken from the theory of
inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The parameter α measures the importance
of inequity concerns of the inequity averse seller. In the present model he wants the trade
surplus, whose realization he facilitates by refraining from consuming the good himself, to
be divided equally. If the good is traded and the buyer’s payoff is higher than the seller’s
allotment of the trade surplus, an inequity averse seller suffers an utility loss. The selfish
seller has no concerns for inequity. This application of inequity aversion is based upon two
implicit assumptions. First, an inequity averse seller does not suffer if his allotment of the
trade surplus is higher than the buyer’s payoff. And second, even an inequity averse seller
does not care for the buyer’s payoff if the good is not traded.
There are proportional costs of bargaining, buyer and seller discount when progressing from
Period 2 to Period 3. For notational simplicity, there is no discounting between Period 1
and 2. Buyer and seller share a common discount factor δ ∈]0, 1[ and maximize discounted
utility.
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Finally, define
u0(i) := δ ψ(i)− i and U0 := max
i
{u0(i)} (1.1)
as a seller’s utility from himself consuming a good of quality i at the end of Period 3, and U0
is the corresponding maximum utility after choosing the optimal investments. These utilities
do not depend on the seller’s type. Note that U0 must be strictly positive as u0(0) is zero
and u′0(0) > 0 by Assumption 1.1.
1.2.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signalling
As shown below the seller’s bargaining behavior depends on his preferences. As preferences
are private information, bargaining takes place under incomplete information. The relevant
equilibrium notion is the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium each player’s strategy must be optimal given his type, his beliefs about the other
player’s types, and the other player’s type-dependent strategy. Whenever possible beliefs
have to be consistent with the other player’s equilibrium strategy. Thus, the buyer’s belief
must be determined by Bayes’ rule after observing an action played with positive probability
in equilibrium. However, Bayes’ rule cannot be applied when observing an out-of-equilibrium
action. Beliefs may then be chosen at will.
The present model is a two-dimensional signalling game. The seller’s signal is his investment
i in Period 1 and his proposal s1 at the beginning of Period 2. Let µ(i, s1) denote the
probability with which the buyer believes the seller to be inequity averse after observing
(i, s1). The buyer’s response is his acceptance decision in Period 2 and his proposal s2 in
Period 3. As the seller may not take any action in the mean time the buyer’s belief remains
unchanged.5 The next action of the seller is his acceptance decision at the end of Period 3
but this action ends the game. Consequently, only the seller’s investment and proposal are
a signal, and only the buyer’s prior π and (possibly) updated belief µ(i, s1) are important in
any perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Note that since the seller’s signal is two-dimensional and
the buyer’s belief µ(i, s1) thus depends on two actions, the seller might change the buyer’s
belief by changing his proposal while keeping the investment fixed.
5Especially, the seller may not not consume the good in Period 2.
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1.2.4 Efficient Investment
Carmichael and MacLeod (2002) point out that concerns for relative payoffs might cause
conceptual problems in a welfare analysis. In the present model efficiency is defined in the
following way. First, since the trade surplus is positive for all investment levels the good
should always be traded. Second, as buyer and both types of seller loose from delaying
trade the good should be traded at the earliest possible moment, and therefore in Period 2.
Building upon these characteristics the efficient investment ie is defined as
ie := arg max
i
{φ(i)− i}. (1.2)
Thus, the efficient investment maximizes the ‘net pie’ generated if the good is traded at the
earliest moment. This captures the idea that an allocation should be considered efficient if
it maximizes the pie to be distributed. However, if the seller is inequity averse and gets less
than half the trade surplus, the above defined efficient investment ie is not Pareto optimal
in the usual sense. Indeed, increasing the investment increases the trade surplus. Keeping
the buyer’s utility constant his share in the trade surplus can be reduced whereas the seller’s
share increases. Thus, inequity and the thereby caused suffering is reduced. This utility in-
crease has a first order effect on the inequity averse seller whereas the increase in investment
costs causes only a second order loss in his ‘standard utility’. Therefore, the inequity averse
seller’s utility increases without reducing the utility if the buyer.
Abstracting from these complications suppose the good is always traded in Period 2 and
the seller receives share s1 of the trade surplus. If s1 is constant, the inequity averse seller
maximizes
s1[φ(i)− ψ(i)] + ψ(i)− i− α max[1− 2s1, 0] [φ(i)− ψ(i)] (1.3)
with respect to his investment. By Assumption 1.1 he chooses an inefficiently low investment
unless he gets the entire trade surplus. The same holds true if the seller is selfish. This
constitutes the hold-up problem.
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1.2.5 Complete Contracts
As a benchmark case suppose buyer and seller can sign a complete trade contract conditioning
terms of trade on the seller’s investment. Not surprisingly,
Proposition 1.1 There exist a complete contract so that both types of seller invest efficiently
and the good is always traded in Period 2.
Proof: Consider the following complete contract conditioning on the seller’s investment. “If
the seller chooses the efficient investment ie, seller and buyer trade in Period 2 and the seller
gets the share
sc := min
{
s : s ≥ 1/2 ∧ s [φ(ie)− ψ(ie)] + ψ(ie)− ie ≥ max
i
{δψ(i)− i}
}
(1.4)
of the trade surplus. If the seller chooses any other investment, i 6= ie, seller and buyer may
not trade.” This contract has the following impact on the seller’s incentives. As sc ≥ 1/2,
both types of seller receive the same utility sc[φ(ie) − ψ(ie)] + ψ(ie) − ie if the efficient in-
vestment ie is chosen. For any other investment i, both types of seller receive an utility of
δψ(i) − i. If an sc satisfying the above property exists, the above contract gives both types
of seller the right investment incentives. It further implies that the good is always traded in
Period 2. The remainder of the proof shows the existence of sc.
The utility both types of seller get when investing efficiently is strictly increasing in sc and
converges to φ(ie)− ie as sc converges to 1. By definition of ie and δ < 1
φ(ie)− ie > φ(i)− i > δψ(i)− i ∀ i 6= ie. (1.5)
By continuity and strict monotonicity of the seller’s utility function there thus exists a unique
sc ∈ [1/2 , 1[ satisfying the property required in the contract. Q.E.D.
A complete contract can forbid trade if the seller’s investment is inefficient. This restricts
the seller to a binary choice. Either he invests efficiently, the good is traded, and he gets a
(possible very large) share of the trade surplus. Or he invest inefficiently, the good is not
traded, and he receives nothing of the trade surplus. By definition the efficient investment
maximizes the net pie which can be distributed between buyer and seller. Therefore there
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must exist a share of the trade surplus so that the seller receives at least half the trade surplus
and investment incentives are efficient.
Proposition 1.1 implies that voluntarily leaving a contract incomplete can never improve
incentives. The present model thus argues that buyer and seller should write a complete
contract whenever this is possible. Yet, in some situations this might not be the case. For
example, renegotiation might render the above complete contract not credible. If the seller
has invested inefficiently, both buyer and seller could agree to trade instead of foregoing the
trade surplus as prescribed by the contract. The remainder of the paper concentrates on the
cases where buyer and seller have, for whatever reason, not signed a complete contract.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Equilibrium Bargaining Behavior
As the bargaining game is finite it can be analyzed by backwards induction. In any perfect
Bayesian equilibrium buyer and seller behave in the following way. If the seller rejects the
buyer’s proposal s2 in Period 3, bargaining breaks down and he receives nothing in excess of
his utility ψ(i) from consumption. A selfish seller thus accepts all weakly positive proposals
by the buyer, but an inequity averse seller prefers a bargaining breakdown to trade at very
inequitable conditions. Therefore, he rejects proposals that are strictly positive but smaller
than a certain cutoff. Accounting for the seller’s behavior the buyer has two potentially opti-
mal strategies. Either he bargains aggressively and proposes s2 = 0. In this case he reaps the
entire trade surplus if the seller accepts but trades only if the seller is selfish. Alternatively
the buyer chooses the proposal making the inequity averse seller exactly indifferent between
accepting and rejecting. If the inequity averse seller always accepts in case of difference, the
buyer then reaps only part of the trade surplus but trades with certainty. Any other proposal
cannot be optimal as the buyer could then increase his proposal and get a higher utility
if the good is traded without reducing the probability of trade. Which strategy is optimal
for the buyer depends on his belief. If the buyer is sufficiently convinced to be facing an in-
equity averse seller, he should make the high proposal resulting in certain trade. Otherwise he
should claim the entire trade surplus even though trade then occurs only if the seller is selfish.
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The anticipated bargaining behavior in Period 3 determines the buyer’s acceptance decision
in Period 2. After observing the seller’s investment i and proposal s1 the buyer forms his
belief µ(i, s1). This belief does not change in case of rejecting the seller’s proposal. Moreover,
the buyer’s expected utility from himself proposing in Period 3 is weakly decreasing in his
belief. If µ(i, s1) is high, the buyer makes the high proposal and thus gets little of the trade
surplus. If µ(i, s1) is low, the buyer bargains aggressively but his expected utility decreases
with the probability µ(i, s1) with which he expects the seller to be inequity averse and reject.
Therefore, the maximum proposal s1 acceptable to the buyer is increasing in his belief µ(i, s1).
Including the precise cutoffs the above argument is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.1 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium it is optimal
1. for a selfish seller to accept all s2 ≥ 0, and
2. for an inequity averse seller to accept all s2 ≥ α/(1 + 2α).
Defining µ̃ := α/(1 + 2α), it is optimal for the buyer
3. iff µ(i, s1) ≥ µ̃, to set s2 = α/(1 + 2α) and accept s1 ≤ 1− δ(1 + α)/(1 + 2α),
4. iff µ(i, s1) < µ̃, to set s2 = 0 and accept s1 ≤ 1− δ[1− µ(i, s1)],
if the seller always accepts s2 in case of indifference.
Proof: The game can be analyzed by backwards induction. First, consider the seller in Pe-
riod 3. The selfish seller accepts the buyer’s proposal s2 if and only if s[φ(i)−ψ(i)] + ψ(i) ≥
ψ(i). Thus, he accepts all s2 ≥ 0. The inequity averse seller accepts s2 if and only if
s2[φ(i)−ψ(i)]+ψ(i)−α max[(1−2s2)[φ(i)−ψ(i)], 0] ≥ ψ(i). Thus, he accepts s2 if and only
if s2 ≥ α/(1 + 2α) where this cutoff strictly increases in α and lies in the interval ]0, 1/2[ for
all α ≥ 0.
Second, consider the buyer holding belief µ(i, s1) in Period 3. Suppose the seller accepts if
he is indifferent.6 Thus, if the buyer proposes s2 = α/(1 + 2α), he trades with certainty. His
payoff is then [φ(i)− ψ(i)](1 + α)/(1 + 2α). If the buyer proposes s2 = 0, he gets the entire
trade surplus in case of trade, but trades only if the seller is selfish. His expected payoff is
6Otherwise, there might not exist an optimal proposal of the buyer.
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then [1−µ(i, s1)][φ(i)−ψ(i)]. Any proposal s2 ∈]α/(1+2α), 1] or s2 ∈]0, α/(1+2α)] cannot
be optimal as the buyer can then increase his payoff by lowering s2 without decreasing the
probability of trade. Choosing between two alternatives only, it is optimal for the buyer to
propose s2 = α/(1+2α) if and only if [φ(i)−ψ(i)]·(1+α)/(1+2α) ≥ [1−µ(i, s1)]·[φ(i)−ψ(i)],
and there exists a unique cutoff µ̃ = α/(1 + 2α) strictly increasing in α and lying in the in-
terval [0, 1/2[ making the buyer indifferent between the two proposals. If µ(i, s1) > µ̃, the
buyer should propose s2 = α/(1 + 2α), and if µ(i, s1) < µ̃, he should propose s2 = 0.
After analyzing Period 3, consider the buyer holding belief µ(i, s1) in Period 2. Whether the
buyer accepts the seller’s proposal s1 depends on what he expects to get in Period 3 by reject-
ing. This ultimately depends on his belief µ(i, s1). First, suppose µ(i, s1) > µ̃. After rejecting
s1, the buyer proposes α/(1+2α) in Period 3 which yields payoff [φ(i)−ψ(i)]·(1+α)/(1+2α).
Therefore, the buyer accepts if and only if (1−s1)·[φ(i)−ψ(i)] ≥ δ[φ(i)−ψ(i)]·(1+α)/(1+2α),
or equivalently s1 ≤ 1−δ(1+α)/(1+2α). Second, suppose µ(i, s1) < µ̃. After rejecting s1, the
buyer proposes s2 = 0 in Period 3 which yields an expected payoff [1−µ(i, s1)] · [φ(i)−ψ(i)].
Therefore, the buyer accepts if and only if (1−s1) · [φ(i)−ψ(i)] ≥ δ[1−µ(i, s1)] · [φ(i)−ψ(i)],
or equivalently s1 ≤ 1−δ[1−µ(i, s1)]. Finally, if µ(i, s1) = µ̃, both above cutoffs are identical,
1− δ(1 + α)/(1 + 2α) = 1− δ[1− µ(i, s1)]. Q.E.D.
The seller can thus get a larger share of the trade surplus if he appears to be inequity averse.
However, even if the buyer believes the seller to be inequity averse, the seller might not be
able to get more than half the trade surplus. In this case the ensuing equilibrium analysis is
greatly complicated without adding new insights or changing the idea of the argument. The
following assumption averts tedious case distinctions.
Assumption 1.4 1− δ(1 + α)/(1 + 2α) > 1/2.
Thus, it is assumed that the seller can get more than half the trade surplus if the buyer
believes him to be inequity averse with certainty. Note that the sunk investment costs i do
not influence the suffering from inequity and thus have no impact on the seller’s acceptance
decision in Period 3. Consequently they do not alter any of the cutoffs in Lemma 1.1. Apart
from possibly signalling the seller’s preferences and thereby changing the buyer’s belief, “sunk
costs are sunk”.
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The remainder of this section describes some general characteristics of perfect Bayesian equi-
libria of the considered bargaining game. In any such equilibrium the seller must be dis-
couraged to deviate and choose an out-of-equilibrium investment. Given any deviation the
least favorable response of the buyer is rejecting the seller’s proposal and claiming the entire
trade surplus in Period 3. However, in the spirit of subgame perfection the concept of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium requires the buyer’s equilibrium response to comply with Lemma 1.1.
This imposes the following restrictions. Define a seller’s minimum deviation utility as the
supremum of utility levels he can get by choosing an out-of-equilibrium investment i under
the following three conditions. First, the buyer holds the least favorable belief and believes
the seller to be selfish with certainty. Second, given this belief the buyer chooses the least
favorable equilibrium strategy as characterized in Lemma 1.1. He thus always rejects the
proposal s1 in case of indifference. Thirdly, given the buyer’s unfavorable belief and strategy
the seller chooses the optimal proposal s1 and acceptance decision in Period 3.
According to this definition the seller’s minimum deviation utility is only a function of the
investment and does not depend on the buyer’s belief, the buyer’s strategy, and the seller’s
proposal and acceptance decision. Out-of-equilibrium there is no reason why the buyer should
not reject the proposal s1 in case of indifference. Thus, the minimum deviation utilities can
only be approximated arbitrarily closely but never fully attained.
Lemma 1.2 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium
1. the selfish seller’s minimum deviation utility is given by
ums (i) := (1− δ)[φ(i)− ψ(i)] + ψ(i)− i with ums strictly concave, and
2. the inequity averse seller’s minimum deviation utility is given by
uma (i) := max
[
u0(i), ums (i)− α max[2δ − 1, 0] [φ(i)− ψ(i) ]
]
,
for given investment i.
Proof: For given investment i consider the following strategy of the seller: “Propose s1 = 1
in Period 3 and reject any proposal s2 in Period 3.” If the buyer accepts, the seller receives
φ(i)− i > u0(i). If the buyer rejects, the seller rejects all proposals s2 and gets utility u0(i).
As s1 = 1 > 1/2 and by Assumption 1.3 the seller’s utility is independent of his type. The
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seller can thus always get at least utility u0(i) for any investment i.
However, given any investment i the selfish seller can set s1 = 1−δ−ε with ε strictly positive
but arbitrarily close to zero. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium the buyer’s behavior is
characterized by Lemma 1.1. The buyer thus accepts s1 = 1−δ− ε for all beliefs µ(i, s1) ≥ 0.
As ε goes to zero, φ(i) > ψ(i) for all i > 0 implies (1− δ)[φ(i)− ψ(i)] + ψ(i)− i > δψ(i)− i.
Furthermore, u(0, s1) = 0 = u0(0) for all s1 including s1 = 1 − δ − ε. Thus, for very
small ε the selfish seller always weakly prefers to propose 1− δ − ε and trade in Period 2 as
compared to consuming the good in Period 3. As ε goes to zero, his utility converges to ums (i).
Finally, consider an inequity averse seller. By the previous argument the seller can trade at
s1 = 1− δ− ε giving him a utility of ums (i)−α max[2δ + 2ε− 1, 0] [φ(i)−ψ(i)]. Alternatively
he can consume the good and receive u0(i). With ε going to zero his minimum deviation
utility is the maximum of these two alternatives. Q.E.D.
The seller can always consume the good himself or trade by proposing s1 marginally less
than 1 − δ. The selfish seller always prefers to trade at these conditions, but the inequity
averse might prefer not to trade if his share 1− δ of the trade surplus is smaller than one half
and the associated suffering from inequity sufficiently large. The last lemma of this section
concerns the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium utility.
Lemma 1.3 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium the inequity averse seller receives a strictly
positive but weakly smaller equilibrium utility than the selfish seller.
Lemma 1.3 follows directly from the definition of the seller’s utility functions. In any perfect
Bayesian equilibrium the equilibrium strategies of the inequity averse seller and the buyer
result in a - possibly degenerate - lottery over outcomes. If the selfish seller mimics the
inequity averse seller, he receives the same lottery. However, given any outcome he enjoys
a weakly higher expected utility as he gets the same rent but never suffers from inequity.
In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium the selfish seller’s equilibrium utility must be weakly
higher than what he can get by deviating. Thus, the selfish seller’s equilibrium utility must
be weakly higher than the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium utility. Moreover, Lemma 1.2
implies that the inequity averse seller can always get U0, which is strictly larger than zero.
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1.3.2 Pure Strategy Equilibria and Equilibrium Dominance
Although the results in the previous section hold for mixed strategy perfect Bayesian equilib-
ria the remainder of the paper concentrates on pure strategies. The following notation and
definitions will be used frequently. In a generic pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium
let (i∗, s∗1) denote the inequity averse seller’s, and let (i
∗∗, s∗∗1 ) denote the selfish seller’s equi-
librium investment and proposal. Given the yet unspecified equilibrium strategy and beliefs
of the buyer the inequity averse seller receives equilibrium utility U∗a and the selfish seller
gets equilibrium utility U∗s .
With pure strategies there are only two classes of equilibria, pooling equilibria and separating
equilibria. Define a pooling equilibrium as a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
which both types of seller choose the same equilibrium investment and proposal which, for
notational simplicity, is denoted by the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium choice (i∗, s∗1).
Bayes rule implies that the buyer does not learn anything about the seller’s type in equilib-
rium, µ(i∗, s∗1) = π. Next, define a separating equilibrium as a pure strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which the inequity averse and selfish seller choose different equilibrium ac-
tions, that is, either i∗ 6= i∗∗, or s∗1 6= s∗∗1 , or both. The buyer then learns the seller’s type in
equilibrium, µ(i∗, s∗1) = 1 and µ(i
∗∗, s∗∗1 ) = 0.
The freedom in setting out-of-equilibrium beliefs usually results in a multiplicity of perfect
Bayesian equilibria. As a response there exists a large literature proposing equilibrium re-
finements. The most commonly accepted equilibrium refinement is the intuitive criterion
which corresponds to the concept of equilibrium dominance if there are only two types.7 In
the context of the present model equilibrium dominance is defined as follows. After out-
of-equilibrium action (i, s1) the buyer’s response is his acceptance decision and proposal s2
in Period 3. An equilibrium response is a response optimal in the sense of Lemma 1.1 for
at least one belief. Action (i, s1) is equilibrium dominated for a certain type of seller if he
receives strictly less than his equilibrium utility for all the buyer’s equilibrium responses.
Given any out-of-equilibrium action a buyer’s belief is reasonable if he assigns a type of seller
zero probability if the action is equilibrium dominated for this but not for the other type. If
7For a more general exposition see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).
18
the action is equilibrium dominated for both or no type of seller, all beliefs are reasonable.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium complies with equilibrium dominance - and thus satisfies the
intuitive criterion - if all out-of-equilibrium beliefs are reasonable.
The following examples might serve as an illustration. First, rejecting a proposal s1 strictly
smaller then 1− δ is not an equilibrium response as it is not optimal for all possible beliefs.
Second, suppose that given the most favorable equilibrium responses by the buyer the inequity
averse seller gets more whereas the selfish seller gets less than his equilibrium utility. In this
case the buyer’s belief is reasonable if he believes the seller to be inequity averse with certainty.
Equilibrium dominance has the following implications.
Lemma 1.4 In any pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium with reasonable beliefs both
types of seller receive the same equilibrium utility.
Proof: The proof works by contradiction. Consider a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium with reasonable beliefs in which the selfish seller receives an equilibrium utility strictly
higher than the inequity averse seller, U∗s > U∗a .
In the following it is shown that there then exists a deviation (i′, s′1) so that given the most
favorable equilibrium response of the buyer the selfish seller receives strictly less whereas the
inequity averse seller receives strictly more than his equilibrium utility. Given reasonable
beliefs the buyer must believe the seller to be inequity averse with certainty after observing
(i′, s′1). The deviation is chosen so that given any equilibrium response to this belief the
inequity averse seller profits from deviating. This completes the contradiction, which thus
implies U∗a ≥ U∗s . Together with U∗s ≥ U∗a from Lemma 1.3 this shows that both types of
seller must receive the same equilibrium utility.
Consider a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the inequity averse seller
chooses (i∗, s∗1) and U
∗
s > U
∗
a . Consider the following deviation (i
′, s′1) with
s′1 = 1− δ(1 + α)/(1 + 2α)− ε, (1.6)
where ε is strictly positive but sufficiently small so that s′1 > 1/2. The investment i
′ is left
unspecified for the time being.
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Accepting upon observing (i′, s′1) is an equilibrium response as it is optimal for µ(i
′, s′1) = 1
by Lemma 1.1. As s′1 > 1/2 both types of seller then get the same utility denoted by
ud(i′) := s′1[φ(i
′)− ψ(i′)] + ψ(i′)− i′. (1.7)
In case of rejecting s′1 Lemma 1.1 implies that the buyer’s most generous equilibrium proposal
is s′2 = α/(1 + 2α). Consider the inequity averse and the selfish seller in turn. First, the
inequity averse seller then gets u0(i′) which is strictly smaller than ud(i′) as s′1 > 1/2 and
δ < 1. Second, the selfish seller then gets δ us(i′, α/(1+2α))− i which is strictly smaller than
ud(i′) for sufficiently small ε. Choose ε sufficiently small in that sense. Note that δ < 1 then
implies s′1 > δα/(1 + 2α). Thus, the most favorable equilibrium response of the buyer after
observing the deviation is accepting, giving both types of seller a utility of ud(i′).
The function ud has the following properties. By Assumption 1.1 it is strictly concave with
unique maximizer id := arg max{ud(i)}. Note that id depends on ε. The maximum equilib-
rium proposal acceptable to the buyer is given by s′1 + ε. Thus, limε→0 u
d(id) ≥ U∗s if the
selfish seller trades the good in Period 2. If the buyer rejects the selfish seller’s proposal
in Period 2, his maximum offer in Period 3 is s2 = α/(1 + α) yielding the selfish seller a
utility of δ us(i, α/(1+α))− i strictly smaller than ud(i) for all investments i and sufficiently
small ε. As consequently limε→0 ud(id) ≥ U∗s , one can find an ε sufficiently small so that
ud(id) > U∗s − ε′ for all ε′ > 0. For the remainder of the proof choose ε and ε′ sufficiently
small so that ud(id) > U∗s − ε′ and U∗s − ε′ > U∗a .
It is next shown that there then exists a non-empty, open interval A :=]i, i[ with strictly
positive lower boundary i so that either ud(i) = U∗a and ud(i) = U∗s − ε′, or alternatively
ud(i) = U∗s − ε′ and ud(i) = U∗a . Given an interval with the above properties, continuity of
ud(i) implies that for all C ∈]U∗a , U∗s − ε′[ there exists at least one i′ ∈ A so that ud(i′) = C
and therefore
U∗a < u
d(i′) < U∗s − ε′ < U∗s . (1.8)
This interval can be constructed as follows. Note that ud(0) = 0 < U0 ≤ U∗a < U∗s − ε′ and
ud(id) ≥ U∗s > U∗a . By the continuity of ud there thus exist x ∈]0, id[ and y ∈]0, id[ so that
ud(x) = U∗a and ud(y) = U∗s − ε′. These boundaries x and y must be different as otherwise
their definition implies U∗a = ud(x) = ud(y) = U∗s − ε′ which contradicts U∗a < U∗s − ε′. Defin-
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ing A :=]x, y[ if x < y and A :=]y, x[ if x > y, there thus exists a non-empty interval A with
strictly positive lower boundary and the above properties. This in turn shows the existence
of a deviation investment i′ with the desired properties.
If the considered Bayesian equilibrium has reasonable beliefs, the buyer must belief the seller
to be inequity averse with certainty after observing (i′, s′1). By Lemma 1.1 he always accepts.
Given this belief and strategy the inequity averse seller deviates to (i′, s′1), and the above
cannot form an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Key to Lemma 1.4 is the dimensionality of the seller’s signal. The proof shows that in any pure
strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium with reasonable beliefs there must exist a profitable
deviation for the inequity averse seller if he receives a lower equilibrium utility than the
selfish seller. Consider a deviation with the maximum proposal so that acceptance is an
equilibrium response of the buyer. The most favorable equilibrium response of the buyer
is acceptance, and - as the deviation proposal is larger than one half - the corresponding
maximum deviation utility is the same for both types. Keeping the deviation proposal fixed
the maximum deviation utility can be adjusted by changing the deviation investment. The
proof shows that there exists an investment so that the maximum deviation utility lies in
between the two equilibrium utilities of the two types of seller. If the buyer’s beliefs are
reasonable he must believe the seller to be inequity averse after observing this deviation, and
accept. This makes the deviation profitable. As by Lemma 1.3 the inequity averse seller
receives a weakly smaller equilibrium utility than the seller seller, this completes the proof.
Lemma 1.4 has a number of important implications.
Lemma 1.5 In any pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium with reasonable beliefs the
buyer may believe the seller to be selfish with certainty after observing an out-of-equilibrium
action.
Consider any out-of-equilibrium action and equilibrium response of the buyer. As the selfish
seller never suffers from inequity, he ultimately receives a weakly higher maximum deviation
utility than the inequity averse seller. Since both types get the same equilibrium utility it
is thus impossible that the inequity averse seller gets strictly more whereas the selfish seller
gets strictly less than his equilibrium utility. Thus, the buyer may always assign positive
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probability to the seller being selfish whenever observing an out-of-equilibrium action. He
may therefore also reasonably believe the seller to be selfish with certainty. This belief is
especially important as it allows the buyer to play his most unfavorable equilibrium response.
This out-of-equilibrium belief will thus be used frequently as to afflict ‘maximum punishment’
for deviations. Lemma 1.4 further implies
Lemma 1.6 In any pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium with reasonable beliefs the
good is always traded in Period 2.
Proof: Consider a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium with reasonable beliefs in
which the buyer does not always accept after observing the inequity averse seller’s equilib-
rium action (i∗, s∗1). Given pure strategies the good is never traded in Period 2. By Lemma 1.1
the buyer never sets s∗2 > α/(1 + 2α) and the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium utility U
∗
a
is given by u0(i∗). By Lemma 1.2 the selfish seller can essentially get ums (i∗) > u0(i∗) by
choosing investment i∗ and a proposal s1 marginally below 1−δ. His equilibrium utility must
be weakly higher than what he can get by deviating. Therefore, U∗s ≥ ums (i∗) which implies
U∗s > U∗a . This contradicts Lemma 1.4.
However, if in all pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria with reasonable beliefs the buyer
always accepts after observing the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium action (i∗, s∗1), the
good must always be traded in Period 2 after observing the selfish seller’ equilibrium action
(i∗∗, s∗∗1 ). There are two cases.
First, consider a pooling equilibrium in which the inequity averse and the selfish seller choose
the same equilibrium action, (i∗, s∗1) = (i
∗∗, s∗∗1 ). As the buyer cannot differentiate be-
tween the seller’s types he must always accept. Second, consider a separating equilibrium in
which the buyer does not always accept after observing the selfish seller’s equilibrium action
(i∗∗, s∗∗1 ). Given pure strategies the buyer never accepts in Period 2. Since action (i
∗∗, s∗∗1 ) is
only chosen by the selfish seller, the buyer learns the seller’s type and his belief is given by
µ(i∗∗, s∗∗1 ) = 0. He then proposes s
∗
2 = 0 by Lemma 1.2 and the selfish seller’s equilibrium
utility U∗s is given by u0(i∗∗). As shown for Lemma 1.2 the selfish seller then profits from devi-
ating to (i∗∗, 1−δ−ε) and the above cannot form a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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Thus, inequity aversion and incomplete information does not cause an inefficient delay of
trade when considering pure strategy equilibria. Intuitively this has the following reason. If
the buyer always rejects after observing the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium investment
and proposal, the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium utility is equal to his outside option by
Lemma 1.1. As given the inequity averse seller’s investment the selfish seller can already get a
higher minimum deviation utility characterized in Lemma 1.2, he must receive an equilibrium
utility higher than the inequity averse seller. This contradicts Lemma 1.4.
Consequently, the good must always be traded in Period 2 in any pooling equilibrium where
the selfish seller and the inequity averse seller choose the same equilibrium action. Finally,
consider separating equilibria. In equilibrium the buyer learns the selfish seller’s type after
observing his equilibrium action. If he rejects, he claims the entire trade surplus in Period 3
and the selfish seller receives only his outside option. Yet, by Lemma 1.2 he profits from
choosing the same equilibrium investment but proposing marginally less than 1−δ in Period 2.
Thus, the good must always be traded in Period 2, which together with Lemma 1.4 has the
following implication.
Lemma 1.7 In any pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium with reasonable beliefs the
inequity averse seller receives at least half the trade surplus.
Proof: By Lemma 1.6 the buyer always accepts after observing the inequity averse seller’s
equilibrium action (i∗, s∗1). Suppose s
∗
1 < 1/2. The inequity averse seller’s equilibrium utility
is then given by U∗a = ua(i∗, s∗1)−i∗. But s∗1 < 1/2 implies ua(i∗, s∗1)−i∗ < us(i∗, s∗1)−i∗ ≤ U∗s
so that U∗s > U∗a . This contradicts U∗a = U∗s . Q.E.D.
If the inequity averse seller receives less than half the trade surplus, he suffers from inequity
in equilibrium. Since the selfish seller never suffers from inequity he could mimic the inequity
averse seller and get a strictly larger utility. He thus receives an equilibrium utility strictly
larger than the inequity averse seller, which contradicts Lemma 1.4.
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1.3.3 Pooling and the Role of Incomplete Information
Building upon the previous sections the following proposition characterizes the set of invest-
ments supportable as equilibrium choice in a pooling equilibrium with reasonable beliefs.
Proposition 1.2 If and only if i∗ ∈ IP , there exists a pooling equilibrium with reasonable
beliefs in which both types of seller invest i∗ and the good is always traded in Period 2. The
set IP is defined as follows.
1. If π < µ̃ and 1− δ(1− π) < 1/2, then IP is empty
and there exists no pooling equilibrium.
2. If π < µ̃ and 1− δ(1− π) ≥ 1/2, then
IP := { i : us
(
i, 1− δ(1− π))− i ≥ maxk{ums (k)}
}
.
3. If π ≥ µ̃, then
IP := { i : us
(
i, 1− δ(1 + α)/(1 + 2α))− i ≥ maxk{ums (k)}
}
.
Unless π < µ̃ and 1 − δ(1 − π) < 1/2, the set IP is non-empty, compact, and convex with
strictly positive lower boundary. If ie ∈ IP , there exists an efficient pooling equilibrium with
reasonable beliefs.
Proof: Lemma 1.6 and Lemma 1.7 imply that in any pooling equilibrium with reasonable
beliefs the buyer always accepts after observing the equilibrium action (i∗, s∗1) and the seller
receives at least half the trade surplus, s∗1 ≥ 1/2. As (i∗, s∗1) is always chosen by both types
of seller, the buyer keeps his prior belief µ(i∗, s∗1) = π. According to Lemma 1.1 this belief
π imposes an upper bound on s∗1 and thus restricts the seller’s maximum equilibrium util-
ity hereby denoted by UP (i) for given equilibrium investment i. The remains of the proof
characterize the set IP of investments so that s∗1 ≥ 1/2 and the maximum equilibrium utility
UP (i) is higher than the maximum deviation payoffs of both types of seller.
The maximum acceptable equilibrium proposal s∗1 the buyer is willing to accept depends
on α, on δ, and on π = µ(i∗, s∗1) as characterized in Lemma 1.1. Note that for π < µ̃
and 1 − δ(1 − π) < 1/2 the maximum acceptable equilibrium proposal s∗1 is smaller than
1/2. In this case there exists no pooling equilibrium with reasonable beliefs conforming with
Lemma 1.7. For all the other cases the maximum s∗1 follows directly from Lemma 1.1.
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Consider next the maximum deviation utility. According to Lemma 1.5 the buyer may reason-
ably believe µ(i, s1) = 0 for all out-of-equilibrium actions (i, s1) 6= (i∗, s∗1). For given deviation
investment i the deviation utility is the minimum deviation utility as in Lemma 1.2. The
selfish seller does not suffer from inequity and thus receives a weakly higher deviation payoff
than the inequity averse seller, ums (i) ≥ uma (i), and he receives a weakly higher maximum
deviation utility than the inequity averse seller, maxi{ums (i)} ≥ maxi{uma (i)}. An investment
i can thus be supported as equilibrium choice in a pooling equilibrium with reasonable beliefs
if and only if UP (i∗) ≥ maxi{ums (i)}.
The remainder of the proof characterizes the properties of IP for the cases other than π < µ̃
and 1 − δ(1 − π) < 1/2. According to Lemma 1.1 the seller then receives an equilibrium
share s∗1 strictly larger than 1 − δ. As thus us(i, s∗1) > ums (i) for all i the set IP must con-
tain ĩ := arg maxi{umS (i)}, and IP is non-empty. The maximum equilibrium utility UP (i)
is strictly concave by Assumption 1.1. IP is thus an upper contour set of a strictly concave
function, and therefore convex. As IP is one-dimensional it forms an interval. As ums (0) = 0
and ∂/∂i {ums (0)} is strictly positive, maxi{ums (i)} > 0. As UP (0) = 0, IPS does not contain
0, is bounded below, and its lower boundary is strictly positive. As UP (i) is strict concave,
UP (i′) < ∂/∂i{UP (i′)}(i′− i) for any i and i′ > i. As limi→∞ ∂/∂i{UP (i)} < 0 there exists a
i with ∂/∂i{UP (i)} < 0, and UPS (i′) eventually falls below maxk{ums (k)} > 0 for sufficiently
large i′ and i. Consequently IPS is bounded above and therefore bounded. Due to the weak
inequality in its definition the boundaries of IPS are included. IPS is thus closed, and therefore
compact. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1.2 and the following argument are illustrated in Figure 1.1. If the seller chooses
the pooling investment, the buyer learns nothing about the seller’s type. His prior belief then
determines the seller’s maximum equilibrium proposal just accepted by the buyer according to
Lemma 1.1. Trade at this maximum proposal marks down the seller’s maximum equilibrium
utility. If the seller chooses any other investment, the buyer may reasonable believe the seller
to be selfish with certainty by Lemma 1.5. The deviation utility is then characterized by
Lemma 1.2.
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As the selfish seller never suffers from inequity he receives a deviation utility weakly higher
than the selfish seller. Consequently, an investments is supportable as equilibrium choice in a
pooling equilibrium with reasonable beliefs if and only if the associated maximum equilibrium
utility exceeds the maximum deviation utility of the selfish seller.
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Figure 1.1: Pooling equilibria for π > µ̃ and 1 − δ < 1/2. Given prior π the maximum accepted
equilibrium proposal is s∗1 = 1−δ(1+α)/(1+2α) giving both types of seller equilibrium utility UP (i)
for equilibrium investment i. The buyer holds out-of-equilibrium belief µ(·, ·) = 0 and Lemma 1.2
determines deviation utilities ums (i) and u
m
a (i) with u
m
s (i) > u
m
a (i) as 1 − δ < 1/2. The set IP of
equilibrium investments satisfying UP (i) ≥ maxk{ums (k)} is thus given by the interval [A, B]. If
preferences are observable, the inequity averse seller gets UP (i) and the selfish seller gets ums (i) for
any investment. The unique equilibrium investments are ia and is.
Although the investment choice is continuous, the buyer’s equilibrium beliefs create a dis-
continuity in the seller’s objective function crucial for investment incentives. If the seller
chooses an investment just marginally lower than the equilibrium investment, the buyer’s
belief changes. This affects the accepted proposal and thus causes a discrete change in util-
ity. The above mentioned discontinuity is created by the interplay between inequity aversion
and incomplete information about preferences. To further highlight this crucial element of
the model the following proposition summarizes the effect of inequity aversion on investment
incentives if preferences are observable.
26
Proposition 1.3 If the seller’s preferences are observable, there exists a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium in which
1. the good is always traded in Period 2,
2. the inequity averse seller proposes s∗1 = 1− δ(1 + α)/(1 + 2α) and
invests i∗ = arg maxi {ua(i, s∗1)− i}, and
3. the selfish seller proposes s∗∗1 = 1− δ and
invests i∗∗ = arg maxi{us(i, s∗∗1 )− i}.
Moreover, ie > i∗ > i∗∗ > 0.
Proof: As the seller’s type is observable the buyer’s belief is independent of the seller’s
investment and proposal. Thus µ(i, s1) = 1 for all (i, s1) if the seller is inequity averse, and
µ(i, s1) = 0 for all (i, s1) if the seller is selfish. For any investment i both types receive their
outside option u0(i) if they do not trade in Period 2. Instead both types of seller prefer to
trade by choosing proposals marginally below the maximum proposals accepted by the buyer
according to Lemma 1.1. The good is thus always traded in Period 2 in equilibrium. By a
shaving argument the inequity averse seller proposes exactly s∗1 = 1− δ(1 + α)/(1 + 2α), the
selfish seller proposes exactly s∗∗2 = 1 − δ, and the buyer accepts. Furthermore, the buyer’s
acceptance decision is independent of the chosen investment. The equilibrium proposals thus
imply the equilibrium investments. They are unique and strictly positive by Assumption 1.1.
Q.E.D.
If preferences are observable, the buyer’s belief is independent of the seller’s action. Applying
Lemma 1.1 with degenerate beliefs the inequity averse seller gets a larger share of the trade
surplus than the selfish seller. However, not even the inequity averse seller receives the entire
trade surplus. Although the inequity averse seller’s investment incentives are improved, both
types of seller under-invest. This is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Incomplete information thus has the following impact on investment incentives. If preferences
are observable, the buyer exploits the hold-up situation less - bargains less aggressively - if
and only if the seller is inequity averse. This changes if information is incomplete. In a
pooling equilibrium the buyer behaves in the same way independent of the seller’s type.
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Thus, investment incentives for both types of seller’s may improve. However, investment
incentives are not always ameliorated as they depend on the considered pooling equilibrium.
For example, in the equilibrium in Figure 1.1 both types of seller choose the same equilibrium
investment i∗ smaller than even the selfish seller’s investment if preferences are observable.
1.3.4 Separation and the Costs of Signalling
It should be strongly emphasized that the signalling in the present model is no ‘cheap talk’.
Since the seller’s signal is two-dimensional, signalling costs depend on the proposal if the latter
is less than one half. If the buyer accepts and the good is traded, the inequity averse seller
suffers from inequity. Both investment and proposal then influence this suffering and thus
have a type-dependent impact on the seller’s utility. Increasing the proposal while keeping
the investment fixed increases the utility of both types of seller by increasing his share of
the trade surplus. The inequity averse seller’s utility rises further as unfavorable inequity
is reduced. Moreover, investing more while keeping the proposal fixed increases the trade
surplus and thus the seller’s allotment of the latter. As the inequity averse seller’s suffering
increases in the trade surplus, this reduces his utility. Thus, there is scope for separating
equilibria in which the selfish seller invests a lot and receives a small share of the large trade
surplus, whereas the inequity averse seller invests a little and receives a more equitable share
of the small trade surplus. Yet, equilibrium dominance has a strong impact.
Proposition 1.4 If and only if the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium investment i∗ is
element of IS := A \ B with
A := { i : ua
(
i, 1− δ(1 + α)/(1 + 2α))− i ≥ maxi{us(i, 1− δ)− i}
}
, and
B := { i : ua(i, 1/2)− i > maxi{us(i, 1− δ)− i}
}
,
there exists a separating equilibrium with reasonable beliefs and the following characteristics.
The good is always traded in Period 2. The selfish seller invests i∗∗ = arg maxk{ums (k)},
proposes s∗∗1 = 1 − δ, and receive equilibrium utility U∗s = us(i∗∗, s∗∗1 ). The inequity averse
seller invests i∗ and proposes s∗1 so that U
∗
a = us(i
∗, s∗1) = U
∗
s .
Moreover, A is non-empty, compact, and convex with strictly positive lower boundary. B is
either empty or a real subset of A, open, and convex. A\B is non-empty and compact, it is
convex if B is empty.
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Proof: The set of separating equilibria with reasonable beliefs is almost entirely determined
by Lemma 1.4 to 1.7: the good is always traded in Period 2, the inequity averse seller re-
ceives at least half the trade surplus, s∗1 ≥ 1/2, and both types of seller must receive the same
equilibrium utility so that U∗s = U∗a . This has the following implications.
The proof first shows that if there exists no profitable deviation for the selfish seller, the same
holds true for the inequity averse seller. Consider first deviations to any out-of-equilibrium
action (i, s1). By Lemma 1.5 the buyer may hold the reasonable belief µ(i, s1) = 0. A seller’s
deviation utility is then given by uma (i) and u
m
s (i) as characterized in Lemma 1.2. Since the
selfish seller never suffers from inequity, ums (i) ≥ uma (i) holds for all i. In equilibrium the
selfish seller may not profit from choosing an out-of-equilibrium action, U∗s ≥ maxi{ums (i)}.
This implies U∗a ≥ maxi{uma (i)}: if the selfish seller cannot profit from choosing an out-of-
equilibrium action, the same holds true for the inequity averse seller.
Moreover, no type of seller profits from exactly mimicking the other type. According to
Lemma 1.6 the good is always traded in Period 2. Therefore, U∗s = us(i∗∗, s∗∗1 ) − i∗∗
and U∗a = ua(i∗, s∗1) − i∗. First, consider the selfish seller mimicking the inequity averse
seller. Since By Lemma 1.7 the inequity averse seller receives at least half the trade surplus,
s∗1 ≥ 1/2, the selfish seller then gets exactly the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium utility,
us(i∗, s∗1) − i∗ = U∗a . As U∗a = U∗s by Lemma 1.4, the selfish seller does not profit from
mimicking the inequity averse seller. Second, consider the inequity averse seller mimicking
the selfish seller. As the selfish seller’s equilibrium proposal can be smaller than 1/2 the
inequity averse seller receives weakly less than the selfish seller’s equilibrium utility when
mimicking the selfish seller, ua(i∗∗, s∗∗1 )− i∗∗ ≤ us(i∗∗, s∗∗1 )− i∗∗ = U∗s . As both types receive
the same equilibrium utility, the inequity averse seller thus receives weakly less than his own
equilibrium utility and does not profit from mimicking the selfish seller.
So far results can be summarized as follows. First, no type profits from mimicking the other
type. Second, if the selfish seller weakly prefers to choose his own equilibrium action (i∗∗, s∗∗1 )
to any out-of-equilibrium action, the inequity averse seller at least weakly prefers to choose
his own equilibrium action (i∗, s∗1).
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As the buyer learns the seller’s type in equilibrium, µ(i∗, s∗1) = 1 and µ(i
∗∗, s∗∗1 ) = 0, the
selfish seller’s equilibrium utility U∗s is essentially predetermined. By Lemma 1.6 the good
must always be traded in Period 2. As µ(i∗∗, s∗∗1 ) = 0 the buyer only accepts if s
∗∗
1 ≤ 1 − δ
by Lemma 1.1. By a shaving argument the selfish seller’s equilibrium proposal is thus given
by s∗∗1 = 1 − δ. Mimicking the inequity averse seller can never be profitable. However, the
selfish seller can get the same share s1 = 1 − δ = s∗∗1 when choosing any out-of-equilibrium
investment. His equilibrium investment must thus be characterized by i∗∗ = arg maxi{ums (i)}
yielding equilibrium utility U∗s = us(i∗∗, 1− δ)− i∗∗.
Given the fixed equilibrium utility U∗s of the selfish seller all those investments can be sup-
ported as the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium choice i∗ for which there exists a proposal
s∗1 equating the equilibrium utilities of both types. Yet there are restrictions on s
∗
1. The
remainder of the proof first describes the restrictions on s∗1 and then characterizes the set IS
of investments supportable as equilibrium choices of the inequity averse seller.
There are the following restrictions on the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium proposal s∗1.
First, note that the buyer learns the inequity averse seller’s type after observing his equi-
librium action, µ(i∗, s∗1) = 1. According to Lemma 1.6 the good must always be traded
in Period 2. Thus, s∗1 may not exceed 1 − δ(1 + α)/(1 + 2α) by Lemma 1.1. Second,
Lemma 1.7 requires s∗1 ≥ 1/2. Thirdly, s∗1 must exceed 1 − δ = s∗∗1 . If s∗1 < 1 − δ, then
us(i∗, s∗1)− i∗ < ums (i∗) < U∗s for all i∗. This contradicts U∗a = U∗s and thus s∗1 ≥ 1− δ. Note
that if s∗1 = 1− δ = s∗∗1 , equality of utilities implies i∗ = i∗∗ and the separating equilibrium is
in fact a pooling equilibrium. Summarizing the inequity averse seller’s equilibrium proposal
s∗1 must lie in the interval [s, s] where s := max[1/2, 1 − δ] and s := 1 − δ(1 + α)/(1 + 2α).
This interval is non-empty.
The remainder of the proof characterizes IS , the set of investments supportable as equilib-
rium choice of the inequity averse seller. Note that U∗a = ua(i∗, s∗1)− i∗. The set IS is defined
so that for all i ∈ IS the following holds: ua(i, s)− i ≤ U∗s and ua(i, s)− i ≥ U∗s with at least
one inequality strict. The continuity of ua(i, s1) in s1 then implies that for all i ∈ IS there
exists an admissible s1 equating the equilibrium utilities of both types.
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Define IS := A \ B where
A :=
{
i : ua(i, s)− i ≥ U∗s
}
, and B :=
{
i : ua(i, 1/2)− i > U∗s }
}
.
With the corresponding definitions of s and s these sets are identical to the sets defined in
the proposition. All i ∈ IS are element of A as ua(i, s) − i ≥ U∗s by definition. Otherwise
there are two cases. First, suppose 1 − δ ≥ 1/2. In this case B is empty and s = 1 − δ.
Since ua(i, s) = ums (i) and u
m
s (i) ≤ maxk{ums (k)} = U∗s , this implies ua(i, s) ≤ U∗s for all
i ∈ A = IS . Second, suppose 1−δ < 1/2. In this case B is non-empty and s = 1/2. However,
all i ∈ IS are not element of B and thus ua(i, s) ≥ U∗s . Taken together the set IS = A \ B
satisfies the above mentioned properties.
This last part of the proof characterizes the properties of A, B, and thus IS . By definition
of s the set A is identical to the set IP for π ≥ µ̃. It thus forms a non-empty, compact
interval with strictly positive lower boundary. Due to the same logic B is either empty or
a bounded, open interval with strictly positive upper lower bound. Even if B is non-empty,
the boundaries of A are not included in B. Consider a boundary i′ of A. By definition
ua(i′, s) − i′ = U∗s . Since s > 1/2 = s this implies U∗s = ua(i′, s) − i′ > us(i′, s) − i′. Thus,
i′ 6∈ B. If B is non-empty, it is thus a real subset of A. This further implies that A \ B is
non-empty. If B is empty, A\B forms an interval and is therefore convex. Otherwise A\B is
an interval with a ‘open hole’ around the selfish seller’s equilibrium investment i∗∗. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1.4 and the following argument are illustrated in Figure 1.2. In a separating
equilibrium the buyer holds the following beliefs. First, he learns the seller’s type after ob-
serving the equilibrium actions. Second, he believes the seller to be selfish after observing any
out-of-equilibrium action. Unless precisely mimicking the inequity averse seller, the selfish
seller can thus always get share 1 − δ of the trade surplus. As shown below mimicking the
inequity averse seller is not profitable for the selfish seller. Thus, the selfish seller’s unique
equilibrium investment maximizes his utility given he receives share 1−δ of the trade surplus.
This determines his equilibrium utility.
According to Lemma 1.4 an investments and proposal is supportable as the inequity averse
seller’s equilibrium action if it equates both type of seller’s equilibrium utility. However, the
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inequity averse seller’s proposal must satisfy the following conditions. First, the good must
always be traded according to Lemma 1.6, which imposes an upper bound by Lemma 1.1.
Second, the proposal must exceed one half by Lemma 1.7. These restrictions on the inequity
averse seller’s equilibrium proposal define the set of possible equilibrium investments.
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Figure 1.2: Separating equilibria for 1−δ < 1/2. The buyer learns the seller’s type in equilibrium.
He otherwise believes the seller to be selfish. The selfish seller gets share 1− δ and utility ums (i) for
all investments i, chooses equilibrium investment i∗∗, and gets equilibrium utility maxi{ums (i)}. By
Lemma 1.6 the good is always traded, by Lemma 1.7 the inequity averse seller gets at least half the
trade surplus. Thus, his equilibrium proposal s∗1 must be weakly smaller than s = 1− δ(1+α)/(1+
2α) and weakly larger than 1/2. In both extreme cases he gets equilibrium utility ua(i, s) − i or
ua(i, 1/2) − i. Lemma 1.4 requires equilibrium utilities to be equal. The set IS of the inequity
averse seller’s equilibrium investments contains all investments i for which there exists s∗1 ∈ [1/2 , s ]
so that ua(i, s
∗
1)− i = maxi{ums (i)}. Thus, IS = [A, B]∪ [B, C]. It does not contain ]B, C[ as given
the minimum admissible proposal 1/2 the inequity averse seller gets more than the selfish seller.
Finally, no type of seller has incentives to deviate. By construction of the equilibrium the
selfish seller is exactly indifferent between choosing his equilibrium action and mimicking
the inequity averse seller. By choice of his equilibrium investment he strictly prefers his
equilibrium action to all out-of-equilibrium actions. Furthermore, the inequity averse receives
a utility weakly smaller than the selfish seller if he deviates or mimics the selfish seller, thus
has a weakly smaller deviation utility, and both types of seller at least weakly prefer their
own equilibrium action to any possible deviations.
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1.4 Conclusion
Although inequity aversion can improve investment incentives in the hold-up problem, the
interaction of inequity aversion and incomplete information about an individual’s preferences
is the key element of the present model. If preferences are observable and the seller always
gets the same share of the trade surplus, changing the investment has a continuous impact on
the trade surplus and the seller’s utility. If preferences are unobservable, changing the invest-
ment might change the buyer’s belief about the seller’s type and thus the buyer’s bargaining
behavior. Depending on these changes, the signalling character of the seller’s investment
creates a discontinuity generating very strong investment incentives.
As with most bargaining games under incomplete information, the game form strongly influ-
ences equilibrium behavior. The quality of the results should be unaffected as long as both
types of seller receive some rent in equilibrium, a rent they can loose by appearing to be of
a certain type.8 In the present model discounting grants both types a first mover advantage.
However, if at least one type of seller receives no rent, the model breaks down.
Suppose, for example, buyer and seller play an ‘ultimatum game’ after the seller has sunk his
investment. In this game the buyer proposes how to split the trade surplus, and the seller
may accept or reject. If the seller accepts the good is traded according to the proposed term
of trade. If the seller rejects, bargaining breaks down and the game ends. The maximum
equilibrium proposal in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium never exceeds the proposal rendering
the inequity averse seller just indifferent between accepting and rejecting. The buyer thus
extracts all rents from the inequity averse seller independently of the buyer’s belief after
observing the seller’s investment. Given that the inequity averse seller always gets his outside
option, convincing the buyer that he is inequity averse has no value to him. He therefore
chooses the investment maximizing his outside option. The same argument holds true if the
bargaining game has any number of periods but the buyer makes all proposals.
8Incorporating two-sided investments by buyer and seller should thus cause no problems as long as a
suitable bargaining game is considered in which both traders get a rent by appearing to be of a certain type.
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Despite the use of the equilibrium refinement ‘equilibrium dominance’, the multiplicity of
perfect Bayesian equilibria does not admit unique empirical predictions. There is little hope
that other refinements can improve the situation. However, this apparent weakness makes
the model consistent with the empirical evidence that efficiency problems caused by incom-
plete contracts are not always equally severe. Furthermore, the model does not argue that
incomplete contracts are efficient, nor does it recommend that contracts should be voluntarily
left incomplete. Yet it explains why the consequences of contractual incompleteness are not
necessarily catastrophic if buyer and seller might be inequity averse and - equally important -
preferences are private information.
Chapter 2
Adverse Selection
and Employment Contracts
2.1 Introduction
Numerous surveys, empirical studies and anecdotes suggest that fairness and social com-
parisons are of great concern for employees. Moreover, investigations by Blinder and Choi
(1990), Bewley (1995), and Campbell and Kamlani (1997) find convincing evidence that em-
ployers account for these concerns. Fairness considerations have thus become an increasingly
accepted explanation for wage stickiness, wage compression, and unemployment of low-skilled
workers. These intuitive implications of fairness and social comparisons are supported and
further deepened by a relatively small but influential collection of theoretical articles. The
present paper adds to this theoretical discussion by investigating a firm’s optimal employment
decision and employment contracts if workers have private information about their produc-
tivity and are inequity averse in the spirit of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). It finds that the
impact of fairness and inequity aversion depends on what the workers compare. Particulary,
if production costs are incorporated in the workers’ comparisons, fairness causes an increasing
income difference and can never account for an unwillingness of firms to employ low-skilled
workers. This contradicts the existing literature incorporating fairness into the labor market.
Consider a single firm intending to employ workers with private information about their pro-
ductivity. There are two types of workers, workers with low production costs and workers
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with high production costs. For simplicity these workers are called productive and unpro-
ductive workers throughout the introduction. All workers are taken to be inequity averse,
they compare themselves with their colleagues. The firm exclusively cares for its profit but
knows that workers are inequity averse and takes this into account. The present paper inves-
tigates the impact of inequity aversion on the firm’s employment decision and employment
contracts. It turns out that the results delicately depend on the workers’ point of reference.
Two extreme cases are considered: workers comparing only income and workers comparing
income minus production costs.
There are the following results. As the two types of workers differ in their productivity they
usually receive different income levels. If workers compare income, those workers getting the
lower income suffer. In order to employ these workers they must receive an income premium
as compensation for this suffering. The firm optimally responds to these additional costs by
reducing the income difference. Inequity aversion thus causes an income compression. More-
over, adjusting employment contracts to the diminished income difference distorts production
quantities of both types of workers. In order to focus on the employment effect of inequity
aversion it is assumed that marginal costs of production converge to zero as production goes
to zero. Thus, asymmetric information never causes an exclusion of unproductive workers.
Inequity aversion, however, introduces an additional distortion on the productive workers’
employment contract. If there are only few unproductive workers, it might then be optimal
for the firm to exclude these workers in order to avoid these distortions. Even though the
labor market is not explicitly modeled, inequity aversion might thus hint at an explanation
for unemployment of unproductive workers. Note that both effects only depend on the initial
income dispersion created by differences in productivity. They are therefore independent of
whether the firm can observe the workers’ productivity or not.
The present paper then shows that the impact of inequity aversion reverses direction if work-
ers compare rents defined as income minus production costs. If productivity is observable,
the firm can exactly compensate each worker for his production costs. Thus, both types of
worker receive zero rent, there is no rent inequality, and inequity aversion is irrelevant. Con-
trary to the case of workers comparing income, introducing asymmetric information changes
the implications of inequity aversion if workers compare rents. If productivity is unobserv-
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able, productive workers must get an informational rent to induce truthful revelation of their
type. This informational rent is exactly what a productive worker can gain by pretending
to be unproductive. The informational rent thus depends on the production quantity speci-
fied for unproductive workers. As unproductive workers are not given an informational rent,
asymmetric information causes a rent inequality for which unproductive workers must be
compensated. The associated costs can only be diminished by reducing the informational
rent, and thus by reducing the unproductive workers’ production quantity. However, this al-
lows the firm to reduce the unproductive workers’ compensation for both rent inequality and
production costs so that their income decreases strongly. The productive workers’ income is
only reduced by the informational rent, and inequity aversion increases the income difference.
Although inequity aversion causes additional distortions these depend only on the rent in-
equality and thus on the informational rent. The compensation for rent inequality can be
made arbitrarily small by reducing the unproductive workers’ production quantity. At the
same time this diminishes the distortions imposed on the productive workers’ employment
contract. As marginal costs of production converge to zero, the first units produced by the
unproductive workers are essentially costless regarding production costs, informational rent,
and compensation for rent inequality. Thus, if the workers are inequity averse and compare
rents, it is always optimal to employ both types of workers, and both types of workers pro-
duce positive production quantities.
Summarizing, the impact of inequity aversion depends on what workers compare. Even if
workers only compare income, the overall effect might be small for reasonable levels of in-
equity aversion. Moreover, if workers account for the other workers’ production costs, the
effect of inequity aversion either reverses direction or is at least diminished. This holds true
for large levels of inequity aversion. Therefore, inequity aversion as such does not seem to
be a strong explanation for the empirically observed phenomena of income compression and
involuntary unemployment of workers with low productivity.
The most prominent theoretical work introducing fairness into the labor market was con-
ducted by Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1988), and Akerlof and Yellen (1990). Ac-
cording to their ‘fair wage effort hypothesis’ workers reduce their work effort if they receive
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less than a ‘fair wage’ depending on other workers’ wages. The fair wage effort hypothesis
is supported by a number of experiments, for example Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993).
Workers’ reaction to ‘unfair’ wages reduces their marginal productivity of labor, which in turn
influences firms’ demand for labor. In a general equilibrium model the authors show that
there exist equilibria in which wages are compressed relative to differences in productivity,
and there is unemployment of low-skilled workers. Yet, firms are confined to flat wage con-
tracts although the story is based on a moral hazard argument and firms correctly anticipate
the workers’ reaction to their wage payments. The present paper explicitly investigates op-
timal incentive contracts. Focussing on the heterogeneity of workers, the source of incentive
problems is not hidden action but hidden characteristics. Adding moral hazard might amplify
the impact of inequity aversion but also complicates the analysis. However, Bartling and von
Siemens (2004b), Bartling and von Siemens (2004a) and the authors cited therein look at the
impact of inequity aversion in a setting of moral hazard with several, homogeneous agents.
In another seminal paper, Frank (1984b) proposes status considerations as an explanation
for wage compression. In his model workers enjoy additional utility if they receive a higher
wage than co-workers. A productive worker might thus reject a higher wage - corresponding
to his high marginal productivity - offered by another firm if by accepting he no longer enjoys
the status of a high earner. Yet there is no asymmetric information in his model, and status
considerations are different from inequity aversion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model. It specifies workers’ pro-
ductivity types, the informational structure, and introduces inequity aversion. Section 2.3
contains the main results of the paper. It first analyzes the informational constraints restrict-
ing the firm’s employment contracts. It then shows that inequity aversion causes an income
compression and possibly an exclusion of unproductive workers if workers compare income.
Next, it demonstrates that if workers compare rents, inequity aversion increases the income
difference between productive and unproductive workers. In addition both types of workers
are then always employed. Section 2.3 analyzes the impact of asymmetric information by
solving the firm’s maximization problem if the workers’ types are observable. Section 2.4
discusses some extensions, and Section 2.5 concludes.
38
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Production, Information and Sequence of Actions
Consider a single firm facing a continuum of workers with measure one. Once employed each
worker can produce some output q with type dependent production costs θ c(q). There are
two types of workers, θg and θb with θb > θg > 0. Since they can produce the same output at
lower costs, workers of type θg are called ‘good’ whereas workers of type θb are called ‘bad’
workers. Moreover,
Assumption 2.1
1. c is strictly increasing and strictly convex for all q > 0.
2. c satisfies the Inada conditions, limq→0 c′(q) = 0 and limq→∞ c′(q) = +∞.
An employed worker’s relationship with the firm is governed by an employment contract. An
employment contract consists of a production quantity q and an income t. Given employment
contract (q, t) a worker has to produce q and receives income t. This generates profit q − t
for the firm.
Asymmetric information about workers’ productivity lies at the heart of the ensuing analysis.
The distribution and eventual revelation of this information is best explained by looking at
the sequence of actions. The model can be roughly divided into three periods.
Period 1: At the beginning of Period 1 each worker’s type is assumed to be private in-
formation and thus only known to him. However, it is common knowledge that types are
independent and each worker is good with probability π ∈]0, 1[ and bad otherwise. As there is
an infinite number of workers the law of large numbers implies that the fraction of good work-
ers is always π. Given its limited information about workers’ productivity the firm designs
a yet unspecified mechanism to be used in Period 1. This mechanism determines whether a
worker gets employed or not. If he is employed, the mechanism assigns him an employment
contract, otherwise the worker remains unemployed.
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The present paper restricts attention to deterministic, direct revelation mechanisms.1 Thus,
the mechanism asks each worker for his productivity and uses only the obtained answers
to determine the job allocation. Since each worker’s type is private information and types
are drawn independently, the firm cannot learn anything about one worker from the an-
nouncements of the others. Thus, it is no restriction to look only at mechanisms in which
each worker’s contract conditions exclusively on his own announcement, and the firm offers
a maximum of two employment contracts (qb, tb) and (qg, tg), one for each type. A worker
chooses contract (qk, tk) by announcing to be of type θk. Given the mechanism and the ex-
pected announcements of the other workers, each worker can decide not to participate. He
then stays unemployed.
Period 2: In Period 2 workers work and the firm receives profit ηk(qk − tk) if fraction ηk
of the workers fulfills employment contract (qk, tk). Furthermore, in the course of Period 2
both the fractions of employed workers satisfying a certain employment contract and each
worker’s type become common knowledge.
Period 3: Thus, there is no asymmetric information at the beginning of Period 3. However,
it is assumed that the information revealed ‘on the job’ may not be used in any way. Thus,
employment contracts may not initially condition on the information revealed in Period 3,
or be renegotiated. This assumption seems justifiable as, for example, workers might already
have a legal claim on their income by having produced the corresponding production quan-
tity in Period 2. The use of this seemingly unnecessary complication will become clear when
defining the workers’ utility function. Finally, employed workers receive their income at the
end of Period 3.
The firm would like to exploit its monopolistic position by giving each worker an income
just sufficient to make him accept work. Yet, each worker’s acceptance decision depends on
his production costs. As costs are type-dependant and types are private information, the
firm faces a standard contract theoretical problem of rent extraction. The present paper
1Looking at the proof of the revelation principle in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), there seems to be no
obvious reason why the revelation principle should not hold if agents are inequity averse. However, this is not
explicitly proven in the present paper.
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differs from the usual literature on mechanism design as it investigates the firm’s optimal
employment decision and employment contracts assuming that workers are inequity averse.
2.2.2 Incorporating Inequity Aversion
Inequity aversion is modeled in the spirit of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In order to apply their
theory of fairness, ‘who compares what with whom in which way’ must be specified. There
are the following general assumptions.
Assumption 2.2
1. The firm maximizes profits.
2. All workers have identical preferences and are inequity averse.
3. Employed workers compare themselves exclusively with other
employed workers.
4. Unemployed workers compare themselves exclusively with other
unemployed workers.
5. Inequity averse workers do not suffer if they feel ‘better off’.
Assumption 2.2 needs some comments. Surely, some firms do care for their workers, and
especially founding entrepreneurs occasionally exhibit a paternalistic trait. For example, in
the 19th century the then privately owned German steel manufacturer Krupp offered his
workers housing and free social services like schooling or a theater. However, this attitude
seems to be vanishing as companies become public. Owners then often consider their share
in the corporation as nothing but a small position in their investment portfolio. Moreover,
the present paper concentrates on inequity aversion of workers and ignores other but selfish
motivations of the firm.
As the main focus is on screening workers with respect to their productivity all workers are
taken to have identical concerns for inequity. Section 2.5 shortly discusses the consequences
if individuals differ in their degree of inequity aversion and this is private information.
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Part 2 and 3 of Assumption 2.2 consider workers’ reference group. Psychologists and behav-
ioral economists seem to believe that individuals mostly compare themselves with individuals
perceived as ‘equal’ and working or living in close proximity.2 The present paper captures
this in the following way. First, the reference group of employed workers consists only of all
the other workers employed within the same firm. Second, the reference group of unemployed
workers consists only of all the other unemployed workers. Thus, the utility of a worker re-
jecting all employment contracts offered by the firm is independent of what the employed
workers get, and the outside option can be normalized to zero. Section 2.5 discusses this
assumption. Thirdly, no worker compares himself with the firm in any way as the present
paper concentrates on inequity aversion amongst workers.
Finally, workers only dislike being worse off but not being better off than their colleagues.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggest that altruistic motivations are dominated by envy. The
present paper focuses on the latter aspect of inequity aversion, which seems plausible in the
context of unobservable characteristics. Not many people complain that they earn more than
their colleagues.
Inequity aversion is formalized as follows. In all definitions below consider a worker of type
θi with θ̂k indicating that he has announced to be of type θk. Suppose the worker is then
employed and has to satisfy employment contract (qk, tk). Let
u(θi, θ̂k) := tk − θi c(qk) (2.1)
denote this worker’s rent defined as his income minus production costs. Define his overall
utility as his rent minus his suffering S(θi, θ̂k) so that
U(θi, θ̂k) := u(θi, θ̂k)− S(θi, θ̂k). (2.2)
The term S(θi, θ̂k) specified below captures the worker’s concerns for inequity. Note that
Assumption 2.2 does not pin down what workers compare. There seems to be no common
agreement on this important issue amongst behavioral economists. The present paper thus
explores the following two alternatives, the first of which is
2See, for example, Festinger (1954) and Williams (1975).
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Definition 2.1 (Comparing Income) Given a direct revelation mechanism, the suffering
of a worker of type θi announcing to be of type θk is given by
S(θi, θ̂k) = α
∑
j=g,b
ηj max[ tj − tk, 0],
where α ≥ 0 is the measure of inequity aversion and ηj is the fraction of workers announcing
to be of type θj.
According to Definition 2.1 inequity averse workers exclusively compare their own income
with the income of the other workers. Production quantities specified in other contracts and
the associated production costs are completely ignored. Many people seem to talk a lot about
their absolute income per year, and Blinder and Choi (1990) suggest that individuals tend
to overemphasize nominal wages. However, ignoring the impact of production costs seems
absurd when taken to extremes. As an illustration consider a worker who receives 2000 Euro
per month and in turn has to spend 1 hour a day at work. If production costs were not
incorporated, this worker would envy another worker who receives 2001 Euro per month but
has to spend 10 hours a day at work. The second definition of inequity aversion perfectly
incorporates production costs.
Definition 2.2 (Comparing Rents) Given a direct revelation mechanism, the suffering of
a worker of type θi announcing to be of type θk is given by
S(θi, θ̂k) = α
∑
j=g,b
∑
m=g,b
ηjm max[u(θm, θ̂j)− u(θi, θ̂k), 0],
where α ≥ 0 is the measure of inequity aversion and ηjm is the fraction of workers of type
θm announcing to be of type θj.
Note that in order to allow a comparison of rents a worker must either know or have a correct
expectation of the other workers’ types. In the present model workers’ learn this informa-
tion in the course of working in the firm. Changing this assumption can cause the following
problems. First, if the workers know the other workers’ types from the start, the firm can
devise simple mechanisms eliciting all information at no costs. Second, if the workers’ types
remain private information, a worker’s utility depends on his belief about the other workers’
types. In this case, psychological game theory must be applied, but doing this is inherently
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difficult.3 These complications are avoided by the revelation of each worker’s type on the
job. Yet the present model degenerates to a static problem of rent extraction since the firm
cannot immediately use this information to revise its employment decision by assumption.
Unfortunately, the experimental evidence cannot really help to discriminate between the two
proposed definitions of inequity aversion. Quite often players’ real effort does not depend
on their chosen action but simply on the time spent playing the experiment. Sometimes a
‘virtual’ effort influences a player’s payoff, but then this effort is translated into monetary
terms. This might create a strong framing effect falsely suggesting that individuals compare
rents. The present paper analyzes the above two extreme cases: workers comparing only
income and workers perfectly incorporating production costs. This simplifies computations
and disentangles the different impacts of inequity aversion.
However, individuals probably account imperfectly for production costs, either as precise
effort functions are not known, or individuals are prone to a self-serving bias like ‘Yes, the
other worker produced more and worked harder than I did. But I also worked hard, so
he should not receive a higher income’. Partially accounting for production costs could be
captured by an additional parameter weighing the extent to which inequity averse workers
incorporate production costs. Preliminary computations seem to suggest that the solution is
continuous in this weight. Working with such a hybrid model should thus generate results
lying in between the two extremes cases studied here.
3Note that the optimal mechanisms proposed in this paper satisfy Bayesian incentive compatibility: a
worker reveals his type truthfully to the firm if he expects that all other workers reveal their type truthfully.
Given the associated Bayesian equilibrium, each worker’s expectation of the type (and therefore which fraction)
of workers choosing a certain contract is correct. One could thus conjecture that the quality of the results is
not changed by applying psychological game theory.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Incentive and Participation Constraints
According to the specification of inequity aversion employed in this model, a worker changes
reference group depending on whether he is employed or not. Therefore, not employing a
worker at all is not equivalent to employing a worker and having him produce nothing while
giving him no income. The firm’s maximization problem must thus explicitly analyze the
employment decision, and optimal mechanisms are found in the following way. First, the
firm’s maximum profit if both types of workers are employed are calculated. Second, the
firm’s maximum profit if only one type of worker is employed are derived. Finally, the firm’s
employment decision follows from a comparison of the maximum profits accruing in the above
two alternatives.4 The following results simplify the computation of the optimal employment
contracts. They hold for both definitions of inequity aversion.
First, suppose the firm employs only one type of worker. Excluding the good workers is not
possible if productivity is unobservable. The firm makes a strictly positive profit only if the
offered employment contract specifies a strictly positive production quantity. If bad workers
get their outside option upon accepting employment, good workers get a strictly positive rent
as they then incur strictly lower production costs. A good worker thus also accepts. More-
over, contracts of the form “burn all workers in oil if the fraction of workers accepting exceeds
the measure 1− π of bad workers” cannot work as each individual worker has measure zero.
A good worker can thus join the firm without changing the fraction of workers accepting and
thus without activating the punishment.
The relevant case is the firm excluding the bad workers. The firm can then extract all rents
from the good workers but looses profit generated by the bad workers. As only one type
of workers is employed and all get the same contract, inequity aversion is irrelevant. The
firm optimally offer a single employment contract (q, t) with t = θg c(q). This employment
contract is just accepted by the good workers. However, if a bad worker accepts, the income
does not cover his higher production costs and in addition he suffers from inequity if workers
4The model does not consider mechanisms employing only a fraction of the good or bad workers.
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compare rents. Bad workers thus reject, and the firm’s profit is given by
R = π [q − θg c(q)]. (2.3)
Maximizing with respect to q the optimal employment contract is characterized by
tNB = θg c(qNB) and c′(qNB) =
1
θg
. (2.4)
Superscript ‘NB’ stands for ‘no bad workers’. Of course, the firm can also use this contract if
the workers’ types are observable. The optimal profit depends on the cost function and the
fraction π of good workers. If this profit is higher than the maximum profit employing both
types of workers, it is indeed optimal for the firm not to employ the bad workers at all.
Second, suppose the firm wants to employ both types of workers and productivity is unob-
servable. Given a direct revelation mechanism it then maximizes its profit
R = π[qg − tg] + (1− π)[qb − tb] (2.5)
with respect to
(PCB) u(θb, θ̂b)− S(θb, θ̂b) ≥ 0,
(PCG) u(θg, θ̂g)− S(θg, θ̂g) ≥ 0,
(ICB) u(θb, θ̂b)− S(θb, θ̂b) ≥ u(θb, θ̂g)− S(θb, θ̂g),
(ICG) u(θg, θ̂g)− S(θg, θ̂g) ≥ u(θg, θ̂b)− S(θg, θ̂b).
Due to the incentive constraints (ICB) and (ICG) all workers reveal their type truthfully.
The participation constraints (PCB) and (PCG) ensure that both types of workers accept.
If there are only two types, usually only two constraints are binding and impose a real
restriction on optimal contracts. The following lemma helps to determine which constraint
may be discarded in the present setting.
Lemma 2.1
1. u(θg, θ̂k) ≥ u(θb, θ̂k) and S(θg, θ̂k) ≤ S(θb, θ̂k) for all k ∈ {g, b}, and
2. ddqk {S(θi, θ̂k)} ≥ 0 and
d
dqk
{S(θi, θ̂m)} ≤ 0 for all i ∈ {g, b} and
k, m ∈ {g, b} with k 6= m.
46
Proof: Choosing contract (qk, tk) good workers benefit equally from income but incur lower
(or if qk = 0, equal) production costs as compared to bad workers. Thus, their rent must
be weakly higher. This weakly decreases unfavorable inequality if workers compare rents. If
workers compare income, the suffering is independent of the workers’ types and thus identical
for good and bad workers.
Suppose qk increases while all other production quantities are kept constant. This reduces
the rent of workers choosing contract (qk, tk). If workers compare rents, their suffering can
potentially only increase whereas the suffering of workers choosing another contract (qm, tm)
can potentially only decrease. If workers compare income, the suffering is independent of
production costs, and Part 2 is trivially satisfied with equality. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.1 follows from the productivity advantage of the good workers. It implies
Lemma 2.2 Suppose the firm employs both types of workers. If the bad workers’ production
quantity is strictly positive, (PCG) is not binding, whereas (PCB) and (ICG) are binding
irrespectively of whether workers compare income or rents.
Proof: First, (PCG) is not binding as due to
u(θg, θ̂g)− S(θg, θ̂g) ≥ u(θg, θ̂b)− S(θg, θ̂b) > u(θb, θ̂b)− S(θb, θ̂b) ≥ 0. (2.6)
The first inequality stems from (ICG), the second from Lemma 2.1, and the third from
(PCB). The second inequality is strict as a good worker has strictly lower production costs
than the bad workers if their production quantity is strictly positive.
Second, (PCB) must be binding as otherwise the firm could decrease tg and tb by the same
amount, keeping tg− tb is constant but increasing its profit. As the production quantities are
not changed, the difference in rents, all S(θi, θ̂k), and consequently all incentive constraints
are not affected.
Thirdly, (ICG) is binding. Otherwise the firm could increase qg and its profit. This equal-
izes (ICG) as u(θg, θ̂g) decreases, S(θg, θ̂g) weakly increases, u(θg, θ̂b) is left unchanged, and
S(θg, θ̂b) weakly decreases. Equally, increasing qg leaves u(θb, θ̂b) unchanged and weakly de-
creases S(θb, θ̂b), thus causing no problems with (PCB). As further u(θb, θ̂g) decreases and
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S(θb, θ̂)g) weakly increases, (ICB) is softened. The non-binding good workers’ participation
constraint can be ignored. Q.E.D.
A good worker can always pretend to be bad. Since he then incurs lower production costs
than the bad worker he has a higher rent and suffers weakly less from inequity. As the utility
given to a bad worker is higher than zero in order to induce participation, a good worker
receives more when pretending to be bad. Since he must get even more when announcing
his type truthfully, participation of the good workers is no issue. However, the bad workers’
participation constraint must be binding as the firm could otherwise increase its profit by
decreasing the income of both types of workers by the same amount. This does not change
the differences in income or rents so that the incentive constraints are unaffected. Finally,
the good workers’ incentive constraint must be binding. Otherwise the firm could raise its
profit by increasing the good workers’ production quantity. This makes the contract of the
good workers less attractive. The bad workers’ incentives constraints are further relaxed as
the changes in suffering - more suffering if they lie and less if they report the truth - add
to this. Participation of the bad workers is left unchanged as their contract - and therefore
their rent - is not altered whereas any suffering once they have joined the firm is potentially
reduced. As participation of the good workers is no issue that aspect can be ignored.
2.3.2 Workers Comparing Income
Throughout this section suppose workers compare income. Consider first the optimal em-
ployment contracts if the firm has to employ both types of workers. Due to the maximum
functions in the workers’ suffering their utility functions have a kink at tg = tb and are thus
not differentiable at this point. This can cause difficulties in the maximization problem, but
fortunately incentive compatibility implies the following lemma. Superscript ‘SB’ stands for
‘second-best’.
Lemma 2.3 Suppose the firm cannot observe the workers’ types, workers compare income,
and the firm employs both types of workers. Then tSBg ≥ tSBb for all α ≥ 0.
Proof: Suppose tSBb > t
SB
g for some α ≥ 0 so that S(θg, θ̂g) = (1 − π) α (tSBb − tSBg ) and
S(θb, θ̂b) = 0. As (PCG) is not binding the optimal employment contracts must satisfy the
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following remaining constraints
(PCB) tSBb − θb c(qSBb ) = 0,
(ICG) (tSBg − tSBb )[1 + (1− π)α] + θg[c(qSBb )− c(qSBg )] = 0,
(ICB) (tSBb − tSBg )[1 + (1− π)α]− θb[c(qSBb )− c(qSBg )] ≥ 0.
Since tSBg < t
SB
b by assumption, (ICG) implies c(q
SB
b )− c(qSBg ) > 0 and
(tSBb − tSBg )[1 + (1− π)α] = −
θg[ c(qSBb )− c(qSBg ) ]
(1− π) α .
After substitution of the above expression (ICB) is satisfied if and only if (θg − θb)[ c(qSBb )−
c(qSBg ) ] ≥ 0. As θb > θg this contradicts c(qSBb ) > c(qSBg ) from (ICG). Q.E.D.
If the bad workers receive a higher income, the good workers reveal their type truthfully only
if they have to produce less than the bad workers. Inequity aversion requires an even greater
reduction in production as compensation for the suffering from getting a lower income. But
bad workers profit more from a lower production quantity than good workers while their
suffering is equal. Therefore, the bad workers must also prefer the good workers’ contract
to their own, and the considered contract cannot be incentive compatible. Building on
Lemma 2.3 an order constraint
(OC) tg − tb ≥ 0
can be added to the constraint set without restricting the attainable maximum. Optimal con-
tracts can now be derived using first order conditions. Note that all arguments for Lemma 2.2
leave the income difference tg − tb constant. Therefore, Lemma 2.2 remains valid if the addi-
tional constraint tg − tb ≥ 0 is introduced.
Consider the firm’s maximization problem including the order constraint (OC). Suppose that
the bad workers’ production quantity is strictly positive so that Lemma 2.2 can be applied.
Assume that (OC) and (ICB) are not binding. Solving the binding (PCB) and (ICG)
tSBg = θg c(q
SB
g ) + (θb − θg) c(qSBb ), (2.7)
characterizes the good worker’s optimal income, whereas
tSBb = θb c(q
SB
b ) +
πα θg
1 + πα
[ c(qSBg )− c(qSBb ) ]. (2.8)
characterizes the bad workers’ optimal income.
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If there is asymmetric information, the good workers must get an informational rent to make
them reveal their type truthfully. Therefore, their income exceeds their production costs by
(θb − θg) c(qSBb ). Inequity aversion does not influence this informational rent. If a worker
announces to be bad, he receives a lower income than the good workers truthfully announcing
their type. If workers compare income, this suffering is independent of whether the worker
is good or bad. In order to make a bad worker participate he must be compensated for this
suffering by an income premium. The bad workers’ income thus exceeds their production
costs θb c(qSBb ). However, the income premium given to the bad workers also neutralizes the
suffering of a good worker pretending to be bad. Even if workers are inequity averse, the
informational rent given to the good workers thus remains (θb − θg) c(qSBb ). As in the case
absent inequity aversion, the informational rent reflects a good worker’s save on production
costs as compared to a bad worker when both satisfy the bad workers’ employment contract.
With inequity aversion the bad workers must be compensated for the income difference. The
latter is thus reduced to
tSBg − tSBb =
θg [ c(qSBg )− c(qSBb ) ]
1 + πα
. (2.9)
Consequently, the order constraint is not binding if and only if qSBg ≥ qSBb . Substitution of
tSBg and t
SB
b shows that (ICB) is then equally not binding.
Substitution of tSBg and t
SB
b turns the firm’s profit into a function strictly concave in q
SB
g and
qSBb . By Assumption 2.1 the unique optimal production quantities exist and are given by
c′(qSBg ) =
1 + πα
θg (1 + α)
and c′(qSBb ) =
1− π
θb − π θg 1+α1+πα
. (2.10)
Inspection of qSBb supports the initial assumption that the bad workers’ production quantity
is strictly positive for all α. Note that as long as (OC) is not binding, the envelope theorem
implies
dR
dα
= − π
2 [ c(qg)− c(qb) ]
(1 + πα)2
< 0 (2.11)
and the firm’s profit is strictly falling in α as the solution is valid if and only if qg ≥ qb and
thus c(qg) ≥ c(qb).
The order constraint is indeed not binding if the workers are not inequity averse, qSBg ≥ qSBb
at α = 0. However, qSBb is strictly increasing whereas q
SB
g is strictly decreasing in α by the
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strict convexity of c. Thus, the income difference strictly decreases in α as long as the above
solution remains valid. Both qSBg and q
SB
b converge as α goes to infinity. Comparing the
corresponding limit expressions yields the following result. If π ≥ θg/θb then qSBg converges
to something weakly larger than qSBb . In this case (OC) and (ICB) remain non-binding and
the above solution valid for all α.
However, if π < θg/θb, there exists a cutoff α̃ so that for all α > α̃ the order constraint and
the bad worker’s incentive constraint become binding. As both types of worker receive the
same income there is no suffering, S(θb, θ̂b) = S(θg, θ̂g) = 0. A worker can only be indifferent
between two contracts with equal income levels if the production quantities are identical.
The binding incentive constraint of the good workers and participation constraint of the bad
workers then imply
tSB := tSBg = t
SB
b = θbc(q
SB
b ) and q
SB := qSBg = q
SB
b (2.12)
which automatically satisfies (ICB). Substitution makes the firm’s profit function strictly
concave in qSB and
c′(qSB) =
1
θb
(2.13)
characterizes the optimal production quantity which is strictly positive and unique by As-
sumption 2.1. Note that in this case qSB and thus the firm’s profit is independent of the
degree α of inequity aversion. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose the firm cannot observe the workers’ types, workers compare in-
come, and the firm employs both types of workers.
1. If π ≥ θg/θb, the firm’s maximum profit and the income difference are strictly decreasing
in α. The income difference is converging to zero as α goes to infinity.
2. If π < θg/θb, there exists a cutoff α̃ > 0 so that for all α < α̃ the income difference and
the firm’s maximum profit are strictly decreasing in α, whereas for all α ≥ α̃ the firm
offers both types of workers a single contract no longer changing in α.
Consider an increase of the good workers’ production quantity. As the good workers incur
higher production costs they must be given a higher income. This increases the income differ-
ence for which the bad workers must be compensated. Their consequent increase in income
51
is an additional cost for the firm. Consider next an increase of the bad workers’ production
quantity. As the bad workers incur higher production costs they must be given a higher
income. As this decreases the income difference they enjoy an additional utility and their
production costs may increase by more than their income. Thus, inequity aversion makes
production by the good workers comparatively more expensive, and production by the bad
workers comparatively cheaper. The firm reacts to this change in ‘real’ production costs
by increasing the production by the bad while decreasing production by the good workers.
Ultimately this compresses income levels.
Building upon these results the firm’s employment decision can be considered. Unfortunately,
the cost function c determines absolute profits and thus strongly influences the firm’s com-
parison between employing all workers and employing only good workers. However, there is
the following result for a special cost function.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose the firm cannot observe the workers’ types, workers compare in-
come, and c(q) = q2/2. If π ≤ θg/θb, it is always optimal for the firm to employ both types
of workers. If π > θg/θb, there exists a cutoff α̂ so that for all α > α̂ it is optimal to employ
only the good workers.
Proof: If the firm employs only the good worker, the optimal production quantity is given
by qSB = 1/θg yielding profit R = π/(2 θg). If the firm employs both types of workers,
Proposition 2.1 implies that its profit is continuous and falling in α. Thus, it is sufficient to
compare the profit of employing only the good workers with the minimum profit of employing
all workers, that is the limit of the maximum profit as α goes to infinity. Depending on π
there are two cases.
First, suppose π < θg/θb. As α eventually exceeds the cutoff α̃ in Proposition 2.1 the firm
offer a single contract to both types of workers. Given the assumed cost function the optimal
contract is characterized by qSB = 1/θb and tSB = 1/(2θb) yielding an limit profit of 1/(2 θb)
as α goes to infinity. But π < θg/θb implies 1/(2 θb) < π/(2 θg) so that it is never optimal to
only employ the good workers for all α smaller than infinity.
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Second, suppose π ≥ θg/θb. In that case the principal offers two different contracts for all α.
As α goes to infinity, the optimal production quantities converge to qSBb = (1− π)/(θb − θg)
and qSBg = π/θg yielding an limit profit of [π
2 θb + θg(1 − 2π)]/[2θg (θb − θg)]. Comparing
profits it is optimal to employ only the good workers if and only if
(1− π)(θg − π θb)
θg (θb − θg) < 0
which is satisfied if and only if π > θg/θb. In these cases there exists a cutoff α̃ so that for
all α ≥ α̃ it is optimal to only employ the good workers. If π = θg/θb the firm is indifferent
between employing only the good workers and employing both types of workers in the limit.
Thus, it strictly prefers to employ both types of workers for all α smaller than infinity. Q.E.D.
If both types of workers are employed and receive different income levels, those workers with
the lower income must be compensated for their suffering. This cost is independent of any
production quantities and can only be reduced by decreasing the income difference as such.
Even after adjusting production quantities to a certain income difference this strongly distorts
the good workers’ contract. If types are very different in their productivity and there are
many good workers, this distortion can become large enough as to make it optimal not to
employ bad workers at all.
2.3.3 Workers Comparing Rents
Results so far seem to suggest that inequity aversion could be an explanation for income
compression and might hint at the reasons for involuntary unemployment of workers with
low productivity. However, the impact of inequity aversion reverses direction if workers
compare rents. In this case inequity aversion increases the income difference while never
causing an exclusion of bad workers. Analogous to the Order Constraint (OC) the following
lemma eliminates the maximum functions in the workers’ utility.
Lemma 2.4 Suppose the firm cannot observe the workers’ types and workers compare rents.
Then u(θg, θ̂g) < u(θb, θ̂b) cannot be incentive compatible.
Proof: Suppose u(θg, θ̂g) < u(θb, θ̂b) and thus S(θg, θ̂g) > 0 and S(θb, θ̂b) = 0. As u(θg, θ̂k) >
u(θb, θ̂k) for all k ∈ {g, b} it must be that S(θg, θ̂b) = 0. Bringing S(θg, θ̂g) on the left
hand side of (ICG) this implies u(θg, θ̂g) ≥ S(θg, θ̂g) + u(θg, θ̂b) > u(θb, θ̂b). This contradicts
u(θg, θ̂g) < u(θb, θ̂b). Q.E.D.
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Suppose the bad workers get a higher rent than the good workers. First, due to his lower
production costs a good worker receives a higher rent than the bad workers if he falsely
pretends to be bad. If the bad workers get a higher rent than the good worker announcing
their true type, a good worker must receive a higher rent reporting to be bad as compared
to announcing the truth. Second, a good worker suffers more from inequity if he reports
his type truthfully as compared to pretending to be bad. Thus, inequity aversion has no
positive impact on incentives, a good worker has no incentives to reveal his type truthfully,
and contracts can only be incentive compatible if the good workers receive a rent at least as
high as the bad workers. The impact of inequity aversion can now be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2.3 Suppose the firm cannot observe the workers’ types and workers compare
rents. Then it is always optimal to employ both types of workers, and the income difference
is increasing in α.
Proposition 2.3 follows from the optimal contracts characterized as follows. If types are pri-
vate information, good workers must be given an informational rent in order to induce them
to reveal their true type. Since bad workers never get a rent, asymmetric information and
screening cause a rent inequality.
Optimal employment contracts account for this in the following way. Lemma 2.4 implies that
good workers get a weakly higher rent so that only bad workers suffer from inequity and
therefore S(θb, θ̂b) = π α[tg − θg c(qg)− tb + θb c(qb)] and S(θg, θ̂g) = 0. Suppose that the bad
workers’ production quantity is strictly positive so that Lemma 2.2 is applicable. Assuming
(ICB) to be non-binding, solving the binding (PCB) and (ICG) then yields
tSBg = θg c(q
SB
g ) + (1 + π α)(θb − θg) c(qSBb ) (2.14)
as the good workers’ optimal income and
tSBb = θb c(q
SB
b ) + π α(θb − θg) c(qSBb ) (2.15)
as the bad workers’ optimal income. Note that both types of workers receive an income
premium in excess of their production costs. Subtracting these premia the rent inequality is
given by (θb − θg) c(qSBb ). This expression coincides with the informational rent required to
induce truthful revelation of the good workers’ type if there is no inequity aversion. The bad
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workers only participate if they receive compensation π α(θb − θg) c(qSBb ) for their suffering
from inequity. As the good workers’ incentive constraint is binding a good worker pretending
to be bad gets the same rent as the remaining good workers revealing their type truthfully.
Thus, a good worker receives the bad workers’ compensation for rent inequity as an additional
rent. His income premium (1+π α) (θb−θg) c(qSBb ) thus exceeds the traditional informational
rent and increases with the degree α of inequity aversion. Consequently, inequity aversion
influences the good workers’ income premium if workers compare rents.
Substitution of the optimal income levels shows that (ICB) is indeed non-binding as long
as c(qSBg ) − c(qSBb ) > 0. Moreover, the profit function is strictly concave in the production
quantities qg and qb. Maximization yields
c′(qSBg ) =
1
θg
and c′(qSBb ) =
[
θb + (θb − θg)
[
π(1 + α)
1− π
]]−1
(2.16)
as the unique solution characterizing the optimal production quantities. Note that qSBb is
strictly positive for all α and Lemma 2.2 may indeed be applied. Moreover, qSBg > q
SB
b at
α = 0, and since qSBg is constant whereas q
SB
b is decreasing in α the solution remains valid
for all α ≥ 0.
If workers compare rents, inequity aversion influences optimal employment contracts only
via the informational rent given to the good workers. As the degree α of inequity aversion
increases so does the compensation of the bad workers and the income premium given to
the good workers. These costs caused by inequity aversion can only be reduced by lowering
the bad workers’ production quantity. Thus, the income of both bad and good workers
may be reduced. However, the marginal decrease of the good workers’ income given by
(1 + πα)θb c′(qb)− θg(1 + πα)c′(qb) is smaller than the marginal decrease of the bad workers’
income given by (1 + πα)θb c′(qb)− θgπαc′(qb). Equivalently, using the optimal income levels
the income difference is given by
tSBg − tSBb = θg [ c(qSBg )− c(qSBb ) ],
where qSBg stays constant whereas q
SB
b decreases with increasing α. Summarizing, the in-
come difference increases as inequity concerns and the associated costs gain more importance.
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As the rent inequality is independent of the good workers’ production quantity, the latter
may be chosen as if there were no asymmetric information or inequity aversion. There is ‘no
distortion at the top’. Furthermore, suppose the good workers get a contract characterized
by tSBg = θgc(q
SB
g ). As they then receive no rent the firm can employ the bad workers by
offering them a contract (qb, tb) = (0, 0) requiring them to produce nothing while giving them
no income. If a bad worker accepts this contract, he gets zero rent. Since there is no rent
inequity both types participate. Additionally, if a bad worker lies and pretends to be good,
he gets a negative rent as his high production costs exceed the income just sufficient for good
workers. Due to his negative rent he also suffers from inequity. Thus, a bad worker has no
incentives to misrepresent his type. If a good worker pretends to be bad, he gets zero rent.
Since this is not more than what he gets by announcing his type truthfully he reports his
true type in equilibrium. Summarizing, there are no problems with respect to incentives and
participation when introducing such a ‘null-contract’. Moreover, such a contract causes zero
costs and the firm can employ the bad workers without affecting its profit. Yet once employed
it is optimal to have the bad workers produce a positive quantity. Marginally increasing the
production quantity of the bad workers marginally increases the firm’s profit by
dR
d qb
= 1− π − c′(qb) [(1− π) θb + (θb − θg)π(1 + α) ]. (2.17)
As the workers’ cost function satisfies the Inada conditions marginal costs converge to zero as
production goes to zero. However, the marginal increase in profit of the firm is always 1− π.
Since c′(qb) converges to zero as qb goes to zero, (2.17) converges to 1−π > 0. Marginal ben-
efits eventually dominate marginal costs for sufficiently small but strictly positive production
quantities, and it is optimal to always employ both types of workers and have them produce
a strictly positive quantity.
2.3.4 The Impact of Asymmetric Information
This subsection investigates the interaction of inequity aversion and asymmetric information.
It characterizes the firm’s optimal employment decision and employment contracts if there
is no asymmetric information. It then contrasts the obtained results with the findings in the
previous subsections. Before getting into the details the following general result simplifies
the analysis. If the workers’ types are observable, incentive constraints are obsolete and the
firm is only restricted by the participation constraints
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(PCB) u(θb, θ̂b)− S(θb, θ̂b) ≥ 0
(PCH) u(θg, θ̂g)− S(θg, θ̂g) ≥ 0.
As the firm could otherwise increase qg or qb, both constraints have to be binding indepen-
dently of whether workers compare income or rents. Let q∗g and q∗b characterized by
c′(q∗g) =
1
θg
and c′(q∗b ) =
1
θb
. (2.18)
denote the optimal production quantities if there is no asymmetric information and workers
are not inequity averse.
First, suppose workers compare income. As in the case of unobservable productivity, an order
constraint can be introduced without affecting the attainable maximum profit of the firm.
However, this time the precise form of the order constraint depends on the optimal production
costs if there is no inequity aversion. The following lemma holds, where superscript ‘FB’
stands for ‘first-best’, that is, observable productivity .
Lemma 2.5 Suppose the firm can observe the workers’ types, workers compare income, and
the firm employs both types of workers.
1. If θg c(q∗g) ≥ θb c(q∗b ), then tFBg ≥ tFBb for all α ≥ 0.
2. if θb c(q∗b ) ≥ θg c(q∗g), then tFBb ≥ tFBg for all α ≥ 0.
Proof: Consider the case θg c(q∗g) ≥ θb c(q∗b ). Suppose tFBb > tFBg . Solving the binding
(PCG) and (PCB) the optimal income levels are given by
tFBg = θgc(q
FB
g ) +
(1− π)α
1 + (1− π)α
[
θb c(qFBb )− θg c(qFBg )
]
and tFBb = θhc(q
FB
b ). (2.19)
This yields an income difference of
tFBb − tFBg =
θb c(qFBb )− θg c(qFBg )
1 + (1− π)α . (2.20)
The solution satisfies tFBb > t
FB
g if and only if θb c(q
FB
b ) is strictly larger than θg c(q
FB
g ). After
substitution of the optimal income levels the firm’s profit function is strictly concave in both
production quantities. Because of the limit assumptions on c′(q) the first order conditions
have a unique solution and the optimal production quantities are given by
θg c
′(qFBg ) = 1 + (1− π)α and θb c′(qFBb ) =
1 + (1− π)α
1 + α
. (2.21)
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With increasing α this implies that qFBg strictly increases, q
FB
b strictly decreases, and the
income difference in (2.20) strictly decreases. As α goes to zero qFBg and q
FB
b converge to
q∗g and q∗b . Since θg c(q
∗
g) ≥ θb c(q∗b ) the income difference is weakly negative at α = 0 and
becomes strictly negative as α increases. Thus, the solution violates tFBb > t
FB
g for all α.
Part 2: Consider next the case θg c(q∗g) ≤ θb c(q∗b ). Suppose tFBg > tFBb . Solving the binding
(PCG) and (PCB) for the optimal income levels yields
tFBg = θgc(q
FB
g ) and tb = θbc(q
FB
b ) +
πα
1 + πα
[
θgc(qFBg )− θbc(qFBb )
]
. (2.22)
The income difference is then given by
tFBg − tFBb =
θg c(qFBg )− θb c(qFBb )
1 + πα
. (2.23)
Thus, this solution satisfies tFBg > t
FB
b as long as θg c(q
FB
g ) is strictly larger than θb c(q
FB
b ).
By substitution and maximization the optimal production quantities are given by
θg c
′(qFBg ) =
1 + πα
1 + α
and θb c′(qFBb ) = 1 + πα. (2.24)
As qFBg is strictly decreasing and q
FB
b is strictly increasing in α, the income difference in
(2.23) is strictly decreasing in α. As α goes to zero qFBg and q
FB
b converge to q
∗
g and q
∗
b . As
θg c(q∗g) ≤ θb c(q∗b ), the solution violates tFBg > tFBb for all α ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
With the use of Lemma 2.5 optimal employment contracts can be easily computed. As sum-
marized by the following proposition the impact of inequity aversion is essentially independent
of whether there is asymmetric information or not.
Proposition 2.4 Suppose the firm can observe the workers’ types, workers compare income,
and the firm employs both types of workers. If θg c(q∗g) 6= θb c(q∗b ), there exists a cutoff α̃ so
that
1. if α < α̃, the income difference and the firm’s maximum profit are
strictly decreasing in α.
2. if α ≥ α̃, the firm offers two contracts with identical income levels but different
production quantities. Both contracts no longer change in α.
If θg c(q∗g) = θb c(q∗b ), inequity aversion has no impact on optimal employment contracts.
58
Proof: First, suppose θg c(q∗g) > θb c(q∗b ), the good workers receive a higher income than the
bad workers if there is no inequity aversion. By Lemma 2.5 the order constraint
(OC) tFBg − tFBb ≥ 0
can be added to the constraint set without restricting the firm’s maximum profit.
Assume that the order constraint is not binding. Solving the binding (PCG) and PCB)
yields optimal income levels as characterized in (2.22). Substitution and maximization yields
optimal production quantities as characterized in (2.24). Since θg c(q∗g) > θb c(q∗b ) the income
difference is strictly positive at α = 0 and the solution is indeed valid for small α. However,
as α goes to infinity qFBg exceeds q
FB
b at some point. Therefore, there exists a cutoff α̃ so
that θg c(qFBg ) < θb c(q
FB
b ) for all larger α ≥ α̃. In this case the solution is invalid and the
order constraint must be binding.
Suppose the order constraint is binding so that the firm must set tFBg = t
FB
b . As the firm
can observe the workers’ types it can offer two contracts with different production quantities
qg and qb but the same income tFB. Solving the participation constraints yields
tFB = θbc(qFBb ) and c(q
FB
g ) =
θb
θh
c(qFBb ). (2.25)
Unfortunately, the firm’s profit function is not necessarily strictly concave in qb after substi-
tution of tFB and qFBg . As done frequently in similar situations the following trick is applied.
Define v(y) as the inverse function of c(y), that is v(y) := c−1(y). As c(q) is strictly increasing
and convex, v(y) is strictly increasing and concave. Moreover,
v′(y) =
1
c′(v(y))
. (2.26)
Thus, limy→c(0) v′(y) = +∞ and limy→∞ v′(y) = 0. Define x := c(qb). The firm’s maximiza-
tion problem can be restated as maximizing its profit
R = πv(θb x/θg) + (1− π) x− θb x (2.27)
with respect to x. The firm’s profit function is now strictly concave in x, and the first order
condition has a unique solution by the assumptions on c′(q). Therefore,
π
θb
θg
v′(θb x/θg) + (1− π)v′(x) = θb (2.28)
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characterizes the optimal production costs x, and thus the optimal production quantities qFBb
with c(qFBb ) = x and q
FB
g = v(θb x/θg).
For the case θg c(q∗g) > θb c(q∗b ) the first-best employment contracts can now be characterized
as follows. At α = 0 the firm offers the first-best contracts absent inequity aversion. These
give the good workers a higher income than the bad workers. As inequity aversion increases
the income difference is compressed. For any production quantities the income of the bad
workers is strictly increasing in α whereas the income of the good workers is constant. The
envelope theorem thus implies that the firm’s maximum profit is strictly decreasing in α as
long as the solution remains valid. As α surpasses some cutoff α̃ the firm offers two employ-
ment contracts giving both types of workers the same income, but the good workers have to
produce more. These contracts remain unchanged as α increases further.
If θg c(q∗g) < θb c(q∗b ), the bad workers are given the higher first-best income absent inequity
aversion. In this case the order constraint is given by tFBb − tFBg ≥ 0 and the optimal em-
ployment contracts are as characterized in (2.19) and (2.21). The remaining argument stays
the same.
Finally, suppose θg c(q∗g) = θb c(q∗b ). In this case the firm accidentally gives both types of
workers the same income even absent inequity aversion. Contracts are not changed as α
increases, and inequity aversion has no impact. Q.E.D.
If both types of workers are paid their production costs, they usually receive different income
levels. Note that contrary to the case of asymmetric information it may well happen that
the bad workers receive a higher income than the good workers. Given an income difference
those workers with the lower income suffer from inequity and must be compensated. The
ensuing logic is identical to the case of asymmetric information and inequity aversion causes
an income compression. However, if both types of workers are (accidentally) paid the same
income absent inequity aversion, inequity aversion has no impact. Further, just as in the
case of asymmetric information it might be optimal for the firm to exclude the bad workers.
Again, results depend on the cost function, but the following proposition holds for a special
cost function.
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Proposition 2.5 Suppose the firm can observe the workers’ types, workers compare income,
and c(q) := q2/2. If θg/θg ≥ 1/4, it is always optimal for the firm to employ both types of
workers. If θg/θg < 1/4, there exist pairs of cutoffs (π̂, α̂) with π̂ < 1 so that for all π > π̂
and α > α̂ it is optimal to employ only the good workers.
Proof: If the firm employs only the good worker, the optimal production quantity is given by
qNB = 1/θg yielding profit RNB = π/(2θg). Superscript ‘NB’ stands for ‘no bad workers’. By
Proposition 2.4 the firm’s maximum profit is continuous and weakly decreasing in α. Thus,
it is sufficient to compare the profit of employing only the good workers with the maximum
profit of employing both types as α goes to infinity.
According to Proposition 2.4 the firm offers two employment contract with identical income
tFB = θb (qFBb )
2/2 and production quantity qFBg = q
FB
b
√
θb/θg. Maximization with respect
to qb yields
qFBb =
π
√
θb/θg + 1− π
θb
.
The maximum profit is then given by
RFB =
[π
√
θgθb + θg (1− π)]2
2 θb θ2g
.
The difference in profits between employing only the good workers and employing both types
of workers is given by
RNB −RFB = (1− π)[π(θb + θg − 2
√
θgθb)− θg]
2 θg θb
.
For π close to zero the above expression is negative and it is optimal to employ both types
of workers. However, RNB −RFB is strictly increasing in π since θb + θg − 2
√
θgθb is strictly
positive as (θb + θg)/2 >
√
θb + θg for all θg 6= θb and θb > θg > 0. As π goes to one the limit
of RNB −RFB is weakly negative if and only if θg/θb ≥ 1/4.
If instead θg/θb < 1/4, there exists a cutoff π̂ < 1 so that RNB −RFB is strictly positive for
all π > π̂. For every π > π̂ there then exists a cutoff α̂ so that it is optimal to employ only
the good workers for all α > α̂. Q.E.D.
The intuition for this result is identical to the case of asymmetric information. Summarizing,
the impact of inequity aversion on the firm’s employment decision and employment contracts
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seems to be independent of whether productivity is observable or not. However, as shown in
the following proposition the consequences of inequity aversion change with the informational
structure if workers compare rents.
Proposition 2.6 Suppose the firm can observe the workers’ types, workers compare rents,
and the firm employs both types of workers. Then inequity aversion has no impact on optimal
employment contracts.
Proof: Suppose u(θg, θ̂g) ≥ u(θg, θ̂g), the good workers receive a weakly higher rent than
the bad workers. As then S(θg, θ̂g) = 0 the binding (PCG) yields u(θg, θ̂g) = 0 and therefore
tFBg = θg c(q
FB
g ). But then S(θb, θ̂b) = 0, and (PCB) implies u(θg, θ̂g) = 0. Therefore,
tFBg = θg c(q
FB
g ). Substitution of the optimal income levels and maximization with respect
to qFBg and q
FB
b yields the same first-best contracts as if there was no inequity aversion. The
same argument holds for u(θg, θ̂g) ≤ u(θg, θ̂g). Q.E.D.
If the workers’ types are observable, the firm can extract all rents by paying an income just
covering production costs. Both types get an equal rent of zero, and inequity aversion is
irrelevant. Artificially creating a rent inequity by giving one type of workers a rent above
zero makes participation of the other type more difficult and expensive. As only participation
matters if types are observable, it is optimal to extract all rents from both types of workers.
If workers account imperfectly for production costs, comparing income and comparing rents
generates countervailing effects. The corresponding relative magnitudes determine the net
consequences of inequity aversion, which are thus influenced by the informational structure.
Indeed, the effect stemming from comparing rents simply vanishes if productivity is observ-
able. Thus, one could conjecture that inequity aversion is a better explanation for income
compression and unemployment of low-skilled workers if the firm is well informed about its
prospective workforce.
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2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Endogenous Outside Option
This section discusses the assumptions taken with respect to the workers’ reference groups.
Suppose unemployed workers compare themselves with employed workers. In this case each
unemployed worker’s utility depends on what fraction of workers accepts which employment
contract. A worker’s outside option is thus endogenous, and the firm might try to profit from
this by deliberately softening the participation constraints. In the ensuing argument assume
that income and rent of unemployed workers are normalized to zero. As before, the impact
of inequity aversion depends on what workers compare.
If workers compare income, the firm profits from inequity aversion. Increasing the income in
a certain employment contract has the following effects. First, a worker choosing the consid-
ered employment contract receives a higher utility. Thus, acceptance is made more attractive
and the worker’s production quantity may be increased. Second, each worker’s outside option
decreases. An unemployed worker receives no and therefore less income than the employed
workers. As he wants to avoid this, participation is facilitated. Thirdly, the income difference
between employed workers with different income levels is changed. If the income difference
increases, the firm might have to raise the compensation necessary for those workers with the
lower income. However, it can be shown that the positive first and second effect dominate
even the negative last effect. Inequity aversion thus increases the firm’s profit. This argument
is essentially independent of whether the workers’ types are observable or not.
The results change if workers compare rents. If the workers’ types are observable, the firm
can extract all rents from good and bad workers. As employed and unemployed workers
receive zero rent, an unemployed worker does not suffer from inequity. Is it possible for the
firm to soften the participation constraint of one type of worker by giving the other type a
positive, higher rent? Without loss of generality suppose good workers receive a positive rent
at least weakly larger then the rent given to bad workers. Consider a bad worker. Whether
he accepts the offered employment contract or not, he always receives a lower rent than the
good workers. If his rent upon accepting employment is weakly larger than zero, he suffers
less if he accepts work. Therefore, a bad worker accepts if he thus receives a weakly positive
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rent. However, his acceptance decision is just the same as if the good workers were given
no rent. As giving the good agents a positive rent causes costs without having a positive
impact on participation of the bad workers, the firm should extract all rents from both types
of workers, and inequity aversion is irrelevant.
Almost the same argument holds if the workers’ types are unobservable. As Lemma 2.1
and 2.4 still hold if the workers’ outside option is endogenous, only the bad workers’ partic-
ipation constraint and the good workers’ incentive constraint must be binding. Moreover,
good workers receive a weakly larger rent than bad workers. Due to the same argument as
above, a bad worker accepts whenever his rent is weakly larger than zero, and his partici-
pation constraint is the same with or without inequity aversion. Consequently, bad workers
receive no income premium for the suffering caused by the informational rent. However, if
workers compare rents, the good workers’ contract is only affected via this income premium
of the bad workers. If the bad workers receive no such premium, inequity aversion has no
effect on the good workers’ contract, and inequity aversion is thus irrelevant. Since these
results are fundamentally different to Proposition 2.3, this shows that changing the workers’
reference group can greatly influence the consequences of inequity aversion.
2.4.2 Heterogenous and Unobservable Preferences
Clearly, not all workers have the same concerns for equity and fairness. Suppose workers are
heterogeneous with respect to their preferences: some workers are inequity averse whereas
some workers are ‘selfish’ and exclusively care for their own rent. Further, assume that all in-
equity averse workers have identical concerns for inequity, workers differ with respect to their
productivity, and all characteristics are independent. Consequently, a worker’s type depends
on his productivity and his degree of inequity aversion. This additional heterogeneity in
preferences might make it possible and desirable for the firm to further discriminate between
the workers. For the sake of the following argument consider a selfish and an inequity averse
worker with identical productivity. Suppose there are two contracts A and B, and that both
types of workers get a higher rent choosing contract A. Only interested in his rent the selfish
worker prefers contract A.
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If workers compare rents, screening with respect to preferences is impossible. If he only cared
for his rent, the inequity averse worker would also prefer contract A. Moreover, inequity
aversion generates an additional preference for contract A: since the worker compares rents
he can only suffer less from inequity when selecting contract A. Thus, the inequity averse
worker must prefer contract A to contract B, and separation is impossible.
Yet if the workers compare income, the firm may be able to screen the workers with respect to
their preferences. Suppose that the firm offers another contract C which specifies an income
higher than the income levels in contract A or B, and that this contract C is accepted by
a strictly positive fraction of workers. Although he then receives a lower rent, the inequity
averse worker might now select contract B as he can thus reduce his suffering with respect
to the workers choosing contract C.
Preliminary computations seem to hint in the following direction. First, the firm might re-
duce the informational rent required by the good inequity averse workers. These workers are
offered an employment contract with very high income but relatively low rent. Good selfish
workers do not accept this contract as they are granted a higher rent if they announce their
true type. However, no single good inequity averse worker mimics the good selfish workers
as he then receives a lower income than the remaining other good inequity averse workers
revealing their type truthfully. All bad workers do not select any of the good workers’ con-
tracts as then their income does not cover their high production costs. In equilibrium the
bad inequity averse workers suffer from inequity and must be granted an income premium as
compensation. Increasing their income reduces unfavorable inequity and thus has a strong
positive effect on their utility. They probably receive a relatively high income but have to
produce a lot. Finally, the firm might have to give the bad selfish workers an informational
rent in order to prevent them from mimicking the bad inequity averse workers.
Computations are complicated as the firm has to screen the workers in two dimensions.
However, further investigations could yield interesting insights into the internal organization
of the firm.
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2.4.3 Optimal Income Taxation
The results of the present paper can be easily applied to a number of other areas. An obvious
application is optimal income taxation if the citizens’ productivity is unknown. Consider
the following renaming of variables. Let θic(q) denote the type-dependent costs of producing
income q. If t is a citizen’s net-income, q− t represents the taxes collected by the state. The
results of the present paper then correspond to a model of optimal income taxation in which
the state is exclusively interested in its tax revenue but citizens care for equality. If citizens
want net-income levels to be equal, the model predicts an income compression. Highly
productive citizens then have to pay relatively high taxes. However, if citizens perfectly
account for production costs, inequity aversion increases the differences in net-income. In
this case, highly productive citizens have to pay enormous taxes stripping them off almost
all rents, whereas less productive citizens are allowed to produce and earn almost nothing.
Yet such a model is lacking in a number of important aspects. First, the state does not trade
off its tax revenue with the well-being of its citizens. Second, no transfers from productive
to less productive citizens are considered. And finally, the state might be able to enforce
participation.
2.5 Conclusion
There is a common notion amongst labor economists that fairness concerns of workers cause
an income or wage compression and offer an explanation for unemployment of low-skilled
workers. The present paper finds that inequity aversion need not have this intuitive impact
on a firm’s employment decision and employment contracts. Although the present paper does
not model the labor market, it is not clear whether this would change the general direction
of the results. However, competing firms bring up a number of altogether different and inter-
esting questions. For example, inequity aversion might then result in a segregation of types
across industries or firms so that all good workers work in one whereas all bad workers work
in another firm. Similarly, some firms might offer very ‘aggressive’ employment contracts
with strong monetary incentives. These firms then attract only workers with little concerns
for inequity. At the same time other firms might specialize on very inequity averse workers
by paying them low but equal wages. Inequity aversion could be a helpful tool to investigate
such labor market peculiarities.
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Although inequity aversion promises a fruitful new perspective on the labor market and the
organization of the firm, the preceding analysis sounds a note of caution. The interaction of
inequity aversion and incentives delicately depends on the workers’ point of reference. This
result coincides with the findings of Bartling and von Siemens (2004b) and Bartling and von
Siemens (2004a). Although the object of comparison seems to be crucial when incorporating
inequity aversion into contract theory and applying it to situations with asymmetric infor-
mation, there seems to be no common agreement on what individuals compare. Empirical
investigations, field studies, and experiments designed to investigate that important issue are
therefore a mandatory next step.
Chapter 3
Team Production∗
3.1 Introduction
If the remuneration of a worker depends on the performance of a team of workers, and if mis-
conduct by a single team member cannot be individually sanctioned, contract theory predicts
that this opens the floodgates to free-riding and generates severe consequences for effort pro-
vision. Indeed, the thus called team production problem is so prevalent that the pioneering
work by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) identifies the associated contractual counter-measures
as the most important determinant of the nature and organization of the firm. However, firms
often use team compensation schemes, and these teams seem to work well and even increase
worker productivity although relatively simple contracts are employed. This contradicts the
theory of incentives. We argue that other-regarding preferences - individuals care for other
team members’ effort choices when determining their own effort contribution - might offer an
explanation for this observation. We assume that agents are inequity averse in the spirit of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and determine optimal contracts accounting for inequity aversion.
We then derive the conditions under which the free-rider problem can be overcome, and in-
vestigate the implications for the internal organization and boundary of the firm.
By now there is substantial evidence that many people do not exclusively pursue their ma-
terial self-interest but exhibit some kind of other-regarding behavior.1 Although it is still
a matter of discussion in which economic environments ‘fairness’ motivations influence deci-
∗The chapter is based on joint work with Björn Bartling from the University of Munich.
1For an overview of the literature see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt (2003)
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sions we argue that team production is a natural candidate. If agents work within a team
and receive a payment conditioning on team output, they know that their own effort choice
affects the monetary payoffs of their team partners. Equally their own monetary payoff is
influenced by the effort choices of the other agents. Thus, ‘team spirit’ might emerge. This
can generate a positive or a negative impact on effort provision.2 If all the other agents in the
team work, an agent might provide high effort even if her effort costs then exceed the increase
in her monetary payoff. The reason is that she feels bad for cheating the other agents by
shirking. Yet, if all other agents shirk, an agent might shirk as well although working would
increase her share of the joint output by more than her effort costs. She shirks in order to
avoid that the other agents free-riding on her.
We investigate the impact of inequity aversion on optimal incentive provision in teams con-
sisting of any number of identical agents. Agents face a binary effort choice, they either work
or shirk. Working causes higher effort costs than shirking. Joint output is a deterministic
function of the number of agents working but does not depend on the identity of the working
or shirking agents. Only joint output is verifiable so that contracts can only condition on
joint output and not on individual effort contributions. The potential free-riding constitutes
the classical team production problem. We depart from the standard literature by assuming
that agents are inequity averse in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In our model agents
compare their rent - monetary payoff minus effort costs - with the rents of the other team
members. Whenever they receive a different rent they suffer a utility loss. We are interested in
the consequences of inequity aversion in two separate settings: a worker-owned firm in which
all proceeds from joint production are divided amongst the agents, and team production
within a firm owned by a principal - an outsider incapable to influence the team’s produc-
tion. In the second case we assume that agents do not compare themselves with the principal.
We derive the following results. In order to explore the impact of inequity aversion we must
compute optimal contracts accounting for inequity aversion. We impose the following re-
strictions on contracts. First, we want contracts to be renegotiation-proof. We thus only
consider budget-balancing contracts. Second, we do not want agents or the principal to have
2The management literature abounds with case studies and empirical evidence. See Rotemberg (2002) for
a survey on ‘organizational behavior’.
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an incentive to bribe one of the other agents to shirk. We thus require contracts to give all
agents incentives to work so that no shirking agent may take up the role of a budget-breaker.
When considering the principal we also limit the reduction in aggregate payoffs imposed on
to the agents in case one agent shirks. Given these arguably reasonable limitations we show
that one can restrict attention to contracts that are ‘equal at the top’. In these contracts all
agents get equal monetary payoffs in case all agents or all but one agent work.
Building upon our insights on optimal incentive provision we can study the interaction of
inequity aversion with team size. We find that inequity aversion facilitates effort provision
as agents suffer from ’shame from cheating’ when shirking. This shame from cheating is es-
sentially independent of the number of agents in the team. Still, the gain in rent attained by
shirking increases with team size if the change in joint production weakly decreases. Hence,
the positive influence of inequity aversion usually falls with the size of the team. Our model
is therefore consistent with the common observation that small teams often work whereas
larger ones suffer from free-riding.
We next apply our general results to worker-owned firms. First, the positive effect of inequity
aversion on team incentives increases the maximum firm size allowing cooperation amongst
the agents. Moreover, if firms consist of more than three agents and there exists a contract
giving all agents sufficient incentives to work, the following contract can implement all agents
working as the unique Nash equilibrium. First, the contract is equal at the top and gives all
workers equal monetary payoffs if all agents or all but one agent work. Second, if more than
one agent shirks then one agent receives the entire output in case an even number of agents
works, and another agent receives the entire output in case an uneven number of agents works.
However, if worker-owned firms decide on their own size, inequity aversion might have neg-
ative consequences. If agents are inequity averse, a newly employed agent requires - and
gets - more than just her effort costs. A team might thus decide not to employ an agent even
though doing so causes no incentive problems and the increase in production exceeds the
agent’s effort costs. If the team is employed by a principal, the negative impact of inequity
aversion vanishes although the positive consequences for incentive provision remain. When-
ever the principal can provide all agents with sufficient incentives to work, he can extract all
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rents. Thus, all agents, including any new agents, get an identical rent of zero, and inequity
aversion does not hinder participation.
The following papers investigate the repercussions of inequity aversion, social norms, or other-
regarding preferences on team incentives. Kandel and Lazear (1992) assume that agents are
influenced by peer pressure formalized by a peer pressure function. They then analyze which
peer pressure functions generate the right incentives for cooperation. We, albeit, explore
optimal incentive contracts given the empirically well founded social preferences developed
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Rey Biel (2003) considers optimal contracts accounting for
inequity aversion in teams of two agents and shows that contracts may use inequity aversion
to facilitate incentive provision by punishing shirking agents with unfavorable inequity off
the equilibrium path. Yet he assumes that effort is contractible and that contracts are not
restricted by the agents’ participation constraints. We explicitly account for participation of
the agents, and individual effort choices are not contractible in our model. Moreover, in our
model agents work as they suffer a utility loss from shame for cheating the other agents. Huck,
Kübler, and Weibull (2003) analyze the effect of social norms on team incentives in a setting
where individual effort choices cannot be inferred. Limiting attention to linear contracts they
focus on the possible multiplicity of equilibria arising from the agents’ desire to coordinate
their effort choices. However, we show that if contracts are not required to be linear they
can be designed to implement certain effort choices as the unique Nash equilibrium. Finally,
Demougin and Fluet (2003), Englmaier and Wambach (2003), Itoh (2003) and Bartling and
von Siemens (2004b) study the impact of other-regarding preferences in situations of moral
hazard with stochastic production functions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the basic model. It explains the
informational structure, defines inequity aversion, and introduces the restrictions imposed
on contracts in order to capture the effects of renegotiation and bribery. Section 3.3 starts
with a description of the optimal contracts accounting for inequity aversion. It then shows
that inequity aversion has a positive impact on incentive provision. Section 3.4 applies the
general results of the previous section to the case of a worker-owned firm. It characterizes the
potential negative effect of inequity aversion on the optimal firm size. Moreover, it explores
under which conditions there exists a contract implementing all agents working as the unique
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Nash equilibrium. Section 3.5 considers teams employed by a principal. It demonstrates
that in this case the potential negative consequences of inequity aversion on firm size vanish.
Section 3.6 discusses some extensions, and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Team Production, Effort and Information
Consider a team of N identical agents who can produce some output x. Let N denote the
set of agents in a team of size N . Each agent i chooses an effort contribution ei ∈ {0, 1}
to team production. Individual effort choices are not verifiable. Effort ei causes costs c(ei)
where c(1) = c > 0 and c(0) = 0. We say an agent ‘works’ if she chooses high effort and
‘shirks’ if she chooses low effort. Let e = 〈ei, e−i〉 be an effort vector consisting of agent i’s
effort ei and the vector e−i of all other agents’ effort choices.
Joint output is a deterministic function x of the number of agents working. It does not de-
pend on the identity of the working or shirking agents. Thus, output reveals the number of
agents working but cannot tell whether a particular agent has worked or shirked. Let x(K)
denote joint output if K agents work. Define ∆x(K) = x(K) − x(K − 1) as the marginal
contribution of the K-th agent working. Output is observable, verifiable, and can be sold at
a price normalized to unity. Thus, K agents working generates a revenue of x(K).
The present paper investigates team incentives in two separate settings. First, it studies a
worker-owned firm in which the firm is the team and proceeds from production are allocated
amongst the agents. Second, it considers the role of a principal who employs a team within
his firm. The principal is unproductive in the sense that he cannot influence joint output.
In order to make the following definitions applicable to both settings they often include a
principal. However, all of them are easily adaptable to the case where agents form a team on
their own.
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3.2.2 Contracts
The relationship between the agents - and potentially between the agents and a principal -
is governed by a contract. A contract S is a function specifying how the revenue generated
by the agents is distributed amongst agents and principal. A contract can use only verifiable
information so that the distribution of the revenue can only condition on joint output. Output
is a deterministic function of the total number of agents working. For each number K of
agents working a contract S thus specifies a vector S(K) consisting of individual monetary
payoffs si(K) for each agent i ∈ N and a monetary payoff sp(K) for the principal. In case
the considered firm is worker-owned set sp(K) = 0 for all K in the following definitions and
expressions. Define y(K) =
∑
si(K) as the sum of monetary payoffs allocated to the agents
and ∆y(K) = y(K)− y(K − 1) as the change in this aggregate payment if K agents rather
than K − 1 agents work. Money can be ‘burned’ but a contract cannot distribute more than
the entire output. Further, we assume strong limited liability so that all payments must be
non-negative. This implies y(K) + sp(K) ≤ x(K), sp(K) ≥ 0, and si(K) ≥ 0 for all i. The
following definitions are used frequently.
Definition 3.1 A contract is called
1. budget-balancing at K if y(K) + sp(K) = x(K),
2. budget-balancing if it is budget-balancing at all K ∈ {0, 1, ..., N},
3. equal at K if si(K) = sj(K) for all i,j ∈ N , and
4. equal at the top if it is equal at K ∈ {N − 1, N}.
Therefore, a contract is budget-balancing if the entire output is distributed. It is called equal
at K if all agents get the same monetary payoff in case K agents work. It is called equal
at the top if all agents get the same monetary payoff in case all agents or all but one agent
work.
3.2.3 Utility Functions
The principal is exclusively interested in his monetary payoff. However, in order to capture
the positive and negative impact of ‘team spirit’ we assume that agents are inequity averse
and suffer a utility loss if they are better or worse off than the other agents. We invoke
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the theory of inequity aversion developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).3 Since we want that
agents suffer from cheating the others when shirking, they incorporate effort costs in their
comparisons.4 Moreover, there seems to be the notion that individuals compare themselves
with other individuals they perceive as ‘equal’ and who work or live in close proximity.5 As
a principal is almost by definition someone outside the team, we assume that agents do not
compare themselves with the principal. Finally, agents are taken to be identical and prefer-
ences are common knowledge.
Formally we define inequity aversion in the following way. Within a team of N agents consider
an effort vector e with K agents working with corresponding vector S(K) of monetary payoffs.
Define agent i’s rent as her monetary payoff net of effort cost
ui(e, S(K)) = si(K)− c(ei). (3.1)
Agents incorporate effort costs and compare rents. Drawing upon Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
we define an agent’s preferences as follows.
Assumption 3.1 Within a team of N agents consider an effort vector e with K agents
working with corresponding vector S(K) of monetary payoffs. Then let
vi(e, S(K)) = ui(e, S(K))
− α 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
max
[
uj(e, S(K))− ui(e, S(K)), 0
]
− β 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
max
[
ui(e, S(K))− uj(e, S(K)), 0
]
denote agent i’s utility.
The parameters α and β measure the importance of inequity concerns for the agents. As
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we assume that an agent suffers a utility loss if she receives a rent
different than other agents, but suffers more from inequity if it is not in her favor, α ≥ β and
1 > β ≥ 0. We normalize the agents’ utility to zero if they decide not to work for the principal.
3For a more general and detailed discussion of social preferences see Fehr and Schmidt (2003).
4Section 3.6 discusses the implications of inequity aversion if agents exclusively compare monetary payoffs.
5See, for example, Festinger (1954) and Williams (1975).
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In order to compare rents agents must either know or have a belief about the other agents’
effort choices. According to our understanding of team production agents work closely to-
gether and get a good impression of who puts in effort and who does not. Hence, we assume
that agents can observe the other agents’ effort decisions but that this information is not
verifiable and cannot be used by the contract.
We know that this assumption is problematic. If the entire effort vector is publicly known
to the agents, a court - or a principal - could devise a simple mechanism truthfully eliciting
all information. By using such a mechanism any effort vector can be implemented at no
informational costs and the team production problem vanishes.6 Yet assuming that each
agent’s effort choice is private information causes new problems. In this case an agent’s utility
depends on her beliefs about the other agents’ effort decisions, and psychological game theory
in the line of Geaneakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) must be applied. Doing this is
inherently difficult, rendering the derivation of optimal contracts a very complicated task.
However, in our Nash equilibria each agent’s belief is correct. We thus conjecture that - apart
from unique implementation - the results of our model also hold if agents cannot observe the
other agents’ effort decisions.
3.2.4 Renegotiation and Bribery
Holmström (1982) and Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) point at the importance of renegotiation
and bribery in limiting the scope of contracts in team production. Agent could initially agree
on a contract that divides output evenly if all agents work, but ‘burns’ the entire output if
at least one agent shirks. Since every agent’s effort decision is thus pivotal all agents have
incentives to work. Holmström (1982) argues that such a contract is not renegotiation-proof.
Once it is clear that one agent has shirked the agents can agree to equally divide what ought
to be burnt. All agents profit from this and renegotiation renders the initial contract not
credible.
We try to capture renegotiation in the following way. Suppose K agents work. After the
output has realized a contract S endows the agents - and the principal - with a legal claim
6Miller (1997) shows that in a team of at least three agents it is possible to implement efficient effort choices
if one agent observes the effort choice of at least one other agent.
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on monetary payoffs summarized by the monetary payoff vector S(K).
Definition 3.2
1. A monetary payoff vector S(K) is renegotiation-proof if and only if there exists
no S′(K) strictly increasing the utility of at least one agent or the principal without
reducing the utility of at least one agent or the principal.
2. A contract S is renegotiation-proof if and only if for all K ∈ {0, 1, ..., N} the mon-
etary payoff vector S(K) is renegotiation-proof for all effort vectors e with K agents
working.
Note that the definition distinguishes between renegotiation-proof monetary payoff vectors
S(K) and renegotiation-proof contracts S. Definition 3.2 has the following implications.
Lemma 3.1 Consider an effort vector e with K agents working.
1. If β < (N − 1)/N , S(K) is renegotiation-proof if and only if it is budget-balancing.
2. If β ≥ (N − 1)/N , S(K) is renegotiation-proof if and only if it is budget-balancing and
ui(e, S) = uj(e, S) for all agents i, j ∈ N .
Proof: Budget-balance is necessary for a vector S(K) of monetary payoffs to be renegotiation-
proof independently of the level of inequity aversion. Suppose this was not the case, that
is consider a S(K) with y(k) + sp(K) < x(K) for some number K of agents working and
associated output x(K). Then S′(K) with s′i(K) = si(K) + [x(K) − sp(K) − y(K)]/N for
all i ∈ N and s′p(K) = sp(K) increases the monetary payoff for all agents by an identical,
strictly positive amount while keeping the inequity between the agents unchanged. Therefore,
all agents are strictly better off under S′(K) whereas the principal is indifferent, and S(K)
is not renegotiation-proof.
Part 2: Budget-balance is also sufficient for S(K) to be renegotiation-proof if agents are
not highly inequity averse, β < (N − 1)/N . Given a budget-balancing S(K) consider any
other S′(K) with different monetary payoffs. Then there must either exist an agent i with
s′i(K) < si(K), or s
′
p(K) < sp(K), or both. If β < (N − 1)/N , each agent’s utility is strictly
increasing in her monetary payoff even if the money taken away from her is given to those
agents with lower utility thus decreasing inequity. The same argument holds for the principal
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who is not inequity averse. Therefore, at least agent i or the principal do not agree to S′(K),
and S(K) is renegotiation-proof.
Part 3: If agents are highly inequity averse, β ≥ (N−1)/N , then given an effort vector e with
K agents working S(K) is renegotiation-proof only if ui(e, S(K)) = uj(e, S(K)) for all i, j ∈
N and S(K) is budget-balancing. Suppose S(K) is budget-balancing but there exist i, j ∈ N
with ui(e, S(K)) > uj(e, S(K)). Define A = {i ∈ N : ui(e, S(K)) ≥ uj(e, S(K))∀ j ∈ N} as
the set of agents with the highest utility, and AC = N \A as its complement. Denote by #A
the cardinality of A. Consider another S′(K) with new monetary payoffs s′i(K) = si(K)− ε
for all i ∈ A, whereas s′j(K) = sj(K) + ε · (#A/#AC) for all j ∈ AC . The principal’s
monetary payoff is not changed, s′p(K) = sp(K). Thus, no money is burnt and S′(K) is
budget-balancing. Choose ε > 0 sufficiently small so that for all i ∈ A, j ∈ AC we keep
ui(e, S′(K)) ≥ uj(e, S′(K)). We can now check whether S′(K) is accepted by all agents.
All agents j ∈ AC receive higher monetary payoffs. Since for all agents j ∈ AC payoffs
increase equally, suffering from inequity with respect to all agents in AC remains unchanged.
However, the suffering with respect to all agents i ∈ A is reduced. Thus, all agents j ∈ AC
prefer S′(K) to S(K). Equally, for all agents i ∈ A utility is changed by
vi(e, S′(K))− vi(e, S(K)) = −ε + β 1
N − 1
∑
j∈AC
[
ε + ε · #A
#AC
]
= ε ·
[
β
N
N − 1 − 1
]
≥ 0.
Thus, all agents i ∈ A weakly prefer S′(K) to S(K). As his payoff is unaffected the principal
is indifferent, and S(K) is not renegotiation-proof. Thus, ui(e, S(K)) = uj(e, S(K)) for all
i, j ∈ N and budget-balance is necessary for a contract to be renegotiation-proof.
Part 4: If β ≥ (N − 1)/N , budget-balance and, given e with K agents working, ui(e, S) =
uj(e, S) for all i, j ∈ N is sufficient for a contract to be renegotiation-proof. Suppose this
condition is satisfied. For any changes in monetary payoffs implied by another S′(K) the
monetary payoff of at least one person, either principal or agent, must be reduced. If the
principal’s payoff is reduced he clearly vetoes S′(K). If only some agents’ monetary pay-
off is reduced, denote by i the agent whose payoff is reduced by the largest amount. Then
ui(e, S′(K)) < ui(e, S(K)) and ui(e, S′(K)) ≤ uj(e, S′(K)) for all j ∈ N . Thus, agent i’s rent
is reduced while in addition she now suffers from inequity with respect to some other agents.
As vi(e, S′(K)) < vi(e, S(K)), agent i prefers S(K) to S′(K). Putting all together, S(K) is
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renegotiation-proof. Note that all the above arguments hold with s′p(K) = sp(K) = 0 and
thus in the absence of a principal. Q.E.D.
Suppose S(K) is not budget-balancing, and consider the following new allocation. First,
keep the principal’s monetary payoff unchanged. Second, take the part of the output which
according to the contract ought to be burned and divide it equally amongst the agents. As
this increases the monetary payoff of all agents without changing their relative standing, all
agents agree. Since the principal’s payoff is unaffected he also agrees. Thus, a contract must
be budget-balancing to be renegotiation-proof, and we restrict attention to contracts that
satisfy
Condition 3.1 Contracts must be budget-balancing.
If agents are not highly inequity averse, β < (N − 1)/N , every budget-balancing contract
is renegotiation-proof. In this case agents do not agree to a reduction in their monetary
payoffs even if this makes it possible to decrease inequity by increasing the monetary payoffs
of agents being worse off. As the principal is exclusively interested in his monetary payoff he
never agrees to a reduction in the latter. If a contract is budget-balancing, any renegotiation
changing monetary payoffs must include a reduction in the monetary payoff of at least one
agent or the principal. Since neither this agent nor the principal agree every budget-balancing
contract is renegotiation-proof if the agents are not highly inequity averse.
If agents are highly inequity averse, β ≥ (N − 1)/N , a budget-balancing monetary payoff
vector S(K) might not be renegotiation-proof. Agents are so keen on diminishing inequity
amongst themselves so that they hand over some of their monetary payoff to agents being
worse off. S(K) is thus renegotiation-proof if and only if it is budget-balancing and all agents
- accidentally - receive the same rent irrespective of their effort choice. Still, given the same
S(K) but another effort vector with the same number of agents working, it is impossible that
all agents still get the same rent. Thus, a contract S could only be renegotiation-proof by
conditioning the vector of monetary payoffs not only on the number of agents working but on
the entire effort vector e. This is unfeasible as individual effort choices are not contractible.
Contrary to an individual monetary payoff vector S(K), a contract S can thus never be
renegotiation-proof if agents are highly inequity averse.
78
If agents are highly inequity averse, the ex post distribution of monetary payoffs is thus usually
determined by renegotiation. Since ex ante incentives depend on this ex post allocation the
result of renegotiation must be determined. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.2 Consider an effort vector e with K agents working. If β ≥ (N − 1)/N
and S(K) is budget-balancing but not renegotiation-proof, renegotiation results in the unique
budget-balancing and renegotiation-proof S′(K) with s′p(K) = sp(K).
If there is scope for renegotiation, agents transfer money amongst themselves until all receive
the same rent. No money is burned in that process and the principal is not affected. It is thus
implicitly assumed that the principal cannot exploit the process of renegotiation to increase
his own material payoff.
As anticipation of ex post efficient renegotiation destroys ex ante incentives, Holmström
(1982) points to the role of an ‘outsider budget-breaker’ defined as someone who cannot
lower output on his own account. Given such an outsider consider the following contract.
“If all agents work, output is divided evenly amongst the agents and the outsider receives no
monetary payoff. If at least one agent shirks, output is not burned but given to the outsider.”
If the outsider does not agree to a reduction in his monetary payoff, he can veto renegotiation.
This renders the initial contract credible.
If outside budget-breaking is possible, the team production problem vanishes and our paper
- as all the other paper written on the same subject during the last decades - is superfluous.
However, Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) argue that budget-breaking generates a new moral
hazard problem. The outside budget-breaker actually prefers one of the agents to shirk. If
bribery is possible, he will bribe one of the agents to reduce effort. Anticipating this the
agents’ ex ante incentives to work are destroyed.
In our model all those could be budget-breakers who cannot lower output on their own
account. Apart from the principal - who cannot influence output by definition - this includes
agents shirking in equilibrium, who cannot lower output any further as they already contribute
the minimum effort. We incorporate Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) in the following way. When
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analyzing team incentives without a principal we restrict attention to those contracts for
which all agents working forms a Nash equilibrium. We do not allow for budget-breaking
agents. When including a principal we make the following restrictions. First, we only look
at optimal - that is cost minimizing - contracts that give all agents incentives to work. We
thus do not allow the principal to employ agents as budget-breakers. Second, we want these
contracts to be bribery-proof in the following sense.
Definition 3.3 Contract S is bribery-proof if and only if the principal has no incentives
to induce one of the agents to shirk.
This has the following implications. By Condition 3.1 we require contracts to be budget-
balancing. As we only consider contracts giving all agents incentives to work the above
definition boils to
Condition 3.2 Given team size N , S must satisfy
x(N)− y(N) ≥ x(N − 1)− y(N − 1),
or ∆ y(N) ≤ ∆ x(N).
Given Condition 3.2 the principal has no monetary incentives to bribe one of the agents as he
prefers all agents working to all but one agent working. This limits the change ∆ y(N) and
thus restricts how hard the principal can collectively punish all agents for one agent shirking.
Note that Condition 3.2 is only sufficient but not necessary as all attempts of bribery might
be rejected even if the principal prefers one of the agents to shirk.
However, Condition 3.2 does not imply that the principal has no incentives to bribe a group
of agents. For a contract to be bribery-proof in a more general sense there should exist no
coalition of agents - and possibly the principal - so that all within the coalition profit from
concerted effort choices. Although theoretically more appealing we do not pursue such an
approach as it would require the use of cooperative game theory.7
7However, doing this would impose additional structure on optimal contracts for those output realization
accruing when more than one agent shirks. We conjecture that this might generate a tendency towards
contracts that are equal for all realizations of joint output.
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The section can be summarized as follows. As we want contracts to be renegotiation-proof we
limit attention to budget-balancing contracts. If agents are highly inequity averse, we further
assume that renegotiation results in a renegotiation-proof distribution of monetary payoffs
without affecting the principal’s payoff. As we want contracts to be immune to bribery we
make the following restrictions. If there is no principal or the team is employed by a principal,
we only consider contracts so that all agents within the team have incentives to work. In
addition, we impose an upper bound on the collective punishment the principal can inflict
upon the agents for one agent shirking.
3.3 Inequity Aversion and Incentives
3.3.1 Incentive Compatibility
In this section we derive optimal contracts taking inequity aversion into account. In general
contracts giving all agents incentives to work are not unique. However, by the following
proposition it is no restriction to concentrate on contracts that are ‘equal at the top’ and
thus divide aggregate payment to agents equally if all agents or all but one agent work.
Proposition 3.1 Given any budget-balancing contract S with aggregate payments y(N) and
y(N − 1), there exists a budget-balancing contract S′ that is ‘equal at the top’, has equal
aggregate payments, and weakly improves incentives to work for all agents.
Proof: If agents are sufficiently inequity averse, β ≥ (N − 1)/N , the ex post distribution
S′(K) of monetary payoffs is determined by renegotiation according to Assumption 3.2. In-
centives depend on the anticipated S′(K). As, apart from y(K), S′(K) is independent of
the initial contract S, replacing the initial contract S with any other contract S′ being equal
at the top and with the same y(K) for K ∈ {N − 1, N} does not change incentives and
Proposition 3.1 is trivially satisfied.
Part 2: For the remainder of the proof assume β < (N − 1)/N . Thus, budget-balancing con-
tracts are not renegotiated and directly determine incentives. First, we show that any budget-
balancing contract S giving some agents unequal payoffs if all agents work, si(N) 6= sj(N) for
some i, j ∈ N , can be transformed into a budget-balancing contract S′ with equal monetary
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payoffs, s′i(N) = s
′
j(N) for all i, j ∈ N without impairing incentives.
Consider any budget-balancing contract S where si(N) 6= sj(N) for some i, j ∈ N . Denote by
B = {i ∈ N : si(N) ≤ sj(N)∀j ∈ N} the set of agents with the lowest monetary payoff if all
agents work. B is non-empty and a strict subset of N . Define C as the subset of agents from
B who have the lowest monetary payoff in case one agent shirks, C = {i ∈ B : si(N − 1) ≤
sj(N − 1)∀ j ∈ N}. For any agent i ∈ N define Hi = {j ∈ N : sj(N − 1) − c > si(N − 1)}
as the set of agents with a strictly higher monetary payoff net of effort costs than agent i if
agent i shirks and all other agents work. Correspondingly, define Li = HCi = N \Hi. Finally,
denote by 〈ei, e∗−i〉 an effort vector e where all agents apart from agent i work, and agent i
chooses effort ei ∈ {0, 1}.
Consider the following transformation of contract S resulting in contract S′:
1. Whenever more than one agent shirks, contract S′ and S are identical, S′(K) = S(K)
for all K ∈ {0, 1, .., N − 2}.
2. If one or no agent shirks, monetary payoffs of all agents i ∈ B are increased, s′i(N−1) =
si(N − 1) + ε(N − 1) and s′i(N) = si(N) + ε(N), where ε(N) and ε(N − 1) are strictly
positive constants.
3. If one or no agent shirks, monetary payoffs of all agents j ∈ BC = N \ B are reduced,
s′j(N − 1) = sj(N − 1)− γ ε(N − 1) and s′j(N) = sj(N)− γ ε(N), where γ = #B/#BC .
Thus, what is given to the agents in B is taken from the agents in BC so that y′(N−1) =
y(N − 1) and y′(N) = y(N), and S′ is again budget-balancing.
4. ε(N) and ε(N − 1) are chosen so that incentives for all agents i ∈ C to work if all other
agents work remain constant. The consequence of this property is explained below.
5. ε(N) and ε(N − 1) are chosen as large as possible but sufficiently small so that the
rank order of the agents is preserved in the following sense. For all i ∈ B, j ∈ BC ,
whenever sj(N) > si(N) then s′j(N) ≥ s′i(N). Further, if sj(N − 1) − c > si(N − 1)
then s′j(N − 1)− c ≥ s′i(N − 1). Finally, if sj(N − 1) > si(N − 1)− c then s′j(N − 1) ≥
s′i(N − 1) − c. Thus, whenever according to the initial contract S an agent j ∈ BC is
strictly better off than an agent i ∈ B if all agents work, if only agent i shirks or if only
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agent j shirks, then according to the new contract S′ she is not strictly worse off in the
corresponding situation.
We will now show that incentives are not impaired in this process. Given the above transfor-
mation only the inequity between agents i ∈ B with respect to agents j ∈ BC changes. The
change in incentives for all agents i ∈ C is thus given by
ε(N) ·
[
1 + (1 + γ)
α#BC
N − 1
]
− ε(N − 1) ·
[
1 + (1 + γ) ·
(
α#(Hi ∩ BC)
N − 1 −
β#(Li ∩ BC)
N − 1
)]
.
As we are in the case where agents are not sufficiently inequity averse to agree to a reduction
in their monetary payoff in the course of potential renegotiations, agent i’s overall utility
vi(e, S(K)) is strictly increasing in her monetary payoff even if favorable inequity thus in-
creases. More formally, as β < (N − 1)/N and γ = #B/BC , ε(N − 1) is multiplied with a
strictly positive factor in the above expression. By choice of the set B, agents i ∈ B have the
lowest possible rank when all agents, including themselves, are working. Thus, these agents
can only improve in their rank by shirking. As some agents j ∈ BC may then be in Li (and
thus not in Hi), we must have #(Hi ∩ BC) ≤ #BC and #(Li ∩ BC) ≥ 0. The marginal
impact of an increase in monetary payoff depends negatively on an agent’s rank: the lower
the rank, the more unfavorable inequity is reduced, and the higher the marginal increase in
utility. Due to the argument above, an increase in the monetary payoff if all agents work has
a higher impact on utility than an increase in monetary payoff if one agent shirks. As ε(N)
and ε(N − 1) are chosen so that the above change in incentives is zero, we get
ε(N) ≤ ε(N − 1)
as ε(N) is multiplied with a larger factor than ε(N − 1).
Consider now the incentives for any agent i ∈ B \ C whenever this set is non-empty. Com-
pared to any agent j ∈ C, si(N − 1) ≥ sj(N − 1) by definition of C and consequently
#(Hi ∩ BC) ≤ #(Hj ∩ BC) and #(Li ∩ BC) ≥ #(Lj ∩ BC). Thus, agents i ∈ B \ C will in
general improve their rank by more when shirking than agents j ∈ C. Since the marginal
impact of the increase ε(N − 1) in monetary payoff if one agent shirks is lower, the incentive
to work hard if all other agents work hard is at least preserved for any agent i ∈ B \ C as it
is at least as large as for any agent j ∈ C.
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Finally, consider any agent i ∈ BC , whose change in incentives is given by
−ε(N)
[
γ − (1 + γ) β#B
N − 1
]
+ ε(N − 1)
[
γ + (1 + γ)
(
α#(Hi ∩ B)
N − 1 −
β#(Li ∩ B)
N − 1
)]
.
Again, the second factor of the above expression and is strictly positive as γ = #B/#BC and
β < (N−1)/N . Since #(Hi∩B) ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ #(Li∩B) ≤ #B, the above expression is at least
weakly positive as ε(N −1) ≥ ε(N), and all agents i ∈ BC keep their incentives to work hard.
Summarizing, the above transformation of the contract S does not harm incentives. Iterated
application eventually yields a contract S with si(N) = sj(N) for all i, j ∈ N . Iterated appli-
cation of this transformation eventually results in a contract S′ with s′i(N) = s
′
j(N)∀ i, j ∈ N .
Part 3: However, after the above transformations S is not yet necessarily equal at the top
as there might exist si(N − 1) 6= sj(N − 1) for at least some i, j ∈ N . In this case define
D = {i ∈ N : si(N − 1) ≥ sj(N − 1)∀j ∈ N} as the set of agents with the highest monetary
payoff if one agent shirks. D is non-empty and a strict subset of N . As the contract is equal
if all agents work, si(N) = sj(N) for all i, j ∈ N , all agents get the same utility if all agents
work. As agents i ∈ D get the highest monetary payoff if one agent shirks, and as their utility
is increasing in their monetary payoff as β < (N − 1)/N , these agents have the minimum
incentive to work if all other agents work.
Consider the following transformation of contract S resulting in contract S′.
1. Whenever more than one agent shirks or when all agents work, the contract is un-
changed, S′(K) = S(K) for all K 6= N − 1.
2. If only one agent shirks, monetary payoffs of all agents i ∈ D are reduced, s′i(N − 1) =
si(N − 1)− ε′(N − 1), where ε′(N − 1) is a strictly positive constant.
3. If only one agent shirks, monetary payoffs of all agents j ∈ DC = N \ D are increased,
s′j(N − 1) = sj(N − 1) + γ′ε′(N − 1), where γ′ = #D/#DC . Thus, what is given to
agents in D is taken from the agents in DC so that y′(N − 1) = y(N − 1), and S′ is
again budget-balancing.
4. ε′(N − 1) is chosen as large as possible but sufficiently small so that the rank order of
the agents is preserved in the following sense. For all i ∈ D and j ∈ DC , s′i(N − 1) ≥
s′j(N − 1).
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As β ≤ (N − 1)/N , an agent’s overall utility is increasing in her monetary payoff. Thus, for
each agent i ∈ D incentives to work increase, whereas for each agent j ∈ DC incentives to
work decrease. Since the transformation preserves the rank order, vi(〈0, e∗−i〉, S′(N − 1)) ≥
vj(〈0, e∗−i〉, S′(N − 1)) for all i ∈ D and j ∈ DC . Thus, minimum incentives over all agents
increase.
Iterated application of the above transformation eventually results in a contract that is equal
at the top, and all agents have an identical incentive to exert effort given all other agents
work. Moreover, minimum incentives over all agents are at least weakly increased. Note that
none of the above transformations affect the principal’s monetary payoff and can thus be
performed without lowering his profit. Q.E.D.
If agents are highly inequity averse, β ≥ (N − 1)/N , most monetary payoff vectors implied
by the initial contract are renegotiated. Incentives are thus determined by renegotiation
as characterized in Assumption 3.2. Apart from the aggregate monetary payoffs y(K) and
y(K − 1) not changed by renegotiation, initial contracts are irrelevant and Proposition 3.1 is
trivially satisfied.
In the more interesting case agents are not highly inequity averse, β < (N −1)/N , and initial
contracts determine incentives. For an illustration of Proposition 3.1 consider a contract that
is not equal at the top. By definition there then exists an agent, say agent i, who gets the
lowest monetary payoff if all agents work. Since all agents incur the same effort costs if all
agents work, agent i then holds the lowest rank - the lowest relative position - with respect
to her rent. Consider the following changes in the contract. Agent i’s monetary payoffs if all
and if all but one agent work are increased. These changes satisfy the following properties.
First, what is given to agent i is taken from the others so that the monetary payoff vector
remains budget-balancing. Second, agent i’s incentives are held constant.
Agents suffer more from being worse off than from being better off than others. Therefore,
the lower the rank of an agent the higher the utility gain from increasing her monetary payoff.
By choice of agent i her rank cannot be lower if she is the only agent shirking as compared
to the situation in which everybody works - in the latter case she already holds the lowest
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possible rank. To keep her incentives unchanged her monetary payoff need never be increased
by a larger amount if all agents work than if only one agent shirks. This has the following
implication for the incentives of the other agents. Due to budget-balance the monetary pay-
off of all other agents decreases weakly more if one agent shirks than if all agents work. As
in the considered case agents are not highly inequity averse and hence enjoy having more
monetary payoff, their incentives to work are never harmed but potentially improved. Thus,
the proposed change renders the contract more equal without harming incentives or altering
aggregate payments to agents. Iterated application of the above procedure finally results in
a contract that is equal at the top.
Note that Proposition 3.1 does not imply that contracts must be equal at the top in order to
give all agents incentives to work. Indeed, if agents are sufficiently inequity averse, unequal
contracts may provide sufficient incentives even if contracts are not renegotiated. However, a
contract that is equal at the top maximizes the minimum incentives of all agents. Thus, the
less inequity averse the agents, the less ‘unequal’ monetary payoffs may be in case all agents
or all but one agent work.
The impact of inequity aversion on team incentives can now be easily derived. Optimal
contracts depend on the level of inequity aversion. If agents are highly inequity averse, there
is the following result.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose β ≥ (N − 1)/N and consider a team of size N . If and only if
∆ y(N) ≥ c,
all N agents working forms a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose agents are highly inequity averse, β ≥ (N − 1)/N . Assumption 3.2 im-
plies that given any budget-balancing contract S and for any effort vector e with K agents
working, the agents will renegotiate S(K) so that in the end S′(K) satisfies ui(e, S′(K)) =
uj(e, S′(K))∀ i, j ∈ N . The aggregate payment y(K) to the agents remains unchanged.
Aggregation over all agents and budget-balance imply effort dependent monetary payoffs of
s′i(K) = c(ei) +
y(K)−Kc
N
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for each agent i. This is anticipated by all agents. After substitution of s′i(K) into the utility
function, each agent has incentives to maximize aggregate monetary payoffs to agents minus
their sum of costs. Q.E.D.
If agents are highly inequity averse, β ≥ (N − 1)/N , renegotiation ensures equal rents for
any initial contract. Anticipating this each agent knows that she will be compensated for the
incurred effort cost and in addition receive a share of the generated surplus distributed to
the agents. If N agents work, the surplus is the agents aggregate monetary payoff minus the
sum of their effort costs, y(N) −N c. Thus, each agent has incentives to exert effort if and
only if her effort costs are smaller than the resulting increase in aggregate payment. Note
that the change in aggregate payments ∆y(K) is not altered by renegotiation but fixed by
the contract. In this respect the contract determines incentives.
If agents are not highly inequity averse, β < (N − 1)/N , budget-balancing contracts are not
renegotiated and directly determine incentives. By Proposition 3.1 we can restrict attention
to contracts that are equal at the top. Therefore, it is possible to derive the precise conditions
under which all agents working can form a Nash equilibrium, and
Proposition 3.3 Suppose β < (N − 1)/N and consider a team of size N . If and only if
∆ y(N) ≥ (1− β) N c,
all N agents working forms a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose β ≥ (Nc− 1)/(Nc). In this case consider a budget-balancing contract that
is equal at the top, si(N) = sj(N) = 1 and si(N − 1) = sj(N − 1) = (N − 1)/N for all
i, j ∈ N . If all agents work, all receive the same monetary payoff while incurring the same
effort costs, their utility is vi(〈1, e∗−i〉, S) = 1 − c for all i ∈ N . Suppose only agent i shirks,
whereas all other agents j 6= i work. In this case uj(〈0, e∗−i〉, S) = (N − 1)/N − c for all j 6= i,
and ui(〈0, e∗−i〉, S) = (N − 1)/N . Thus, agent i’s incentive to exert effort if all other agents
work is given by
vi(〈1, e∗i 〉, S)− vi(〈0, e∗i 〉, S) = 1− c−
[
N − 1
N
− βc
]
,
which is weakly positive iff β ≥ (Nc − 1)/(Nc). Thus, all agents working forms a Nash
equilibrium given a budget-balancing contract that is equal at the top.
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Part 2: Suppose β < (Nc− 1)/(Nc), and there exists a contract S so that all agents working
forms a Nash equilibrium. By Proposition 3.1, all agents working must form a Nash equi-
librium given a budget-balancing contract S′ that is equal at the top. However, this cannot
be as β < (Nc − 1)/(Nc). Therefore, β ≥ (Nc − 1)/(Nc) is sufficient and necessary for the
existence of a budget-balancing contract according to which all agents working forms a Nash
equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Consider a contract S that is equal at the top. If an agent shirks whereas all other agents
work, her monetary payoff is reduced by her share ∆y(N)/N in the reduction of the aggre-
gate payment to all agents but she saves c on effort costs. As the agent is inequity averse
she suffers βc from cheating the other agents. Thus an agent has no incentive to shirk if and
only if ∆y(N)/N ≥ (1− β) c which is equivalent to the condition in Proposition 3.3.
Note that Proposition 3.1 also holds for the case that agents are not inequity averse, β = 0.
Proposition 3.3 then implies that in a team of size N all agents working forms a Nash
equilibrium if and only if
∆ y(N) ≥ N c. (3.2)
Inequity aversion hence has an unambiguously positive effect on incentive provision: the
aggregate punishment needed to induce all agents to work is smaller if agents are inequity
averse.
3.4 The Worker-Owned Firm
3.4.1 The Impact of Inequity Aversion on Incentives
In this section we investigate the team production problem in the context of a worker owned
firm. As there is no principal we set sp(K) = 0 for all K ∈ {0, 1, .., N}, and the workers
share the entire revenue amongst themselves, y(K) = x(K).8 The aggregate punishment
inflicted upon the agents if one agent shirks is thus determined by the production technology,
∆y(K) = ∆x(K). The results of the previous section imply that cooperation arises more
8The same situation arises if firms compete for workers so that no firm (or in the sense of the present
model, no principal) can make positive profits.
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easily if agents are inequity averse. We say all agents working is implementable if there exists
a contract satisfying Condition 3.1 so that all agents working forms a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.4 Consider a worker-owned firm of size N .
1. If ∆ x(N) ≤ c, all agents working is not implementable.
2. If ∆x(N) > c and ∆x(N) < Nc, all agents working is implementable
if and only if β ≥ 1−∆x(N)/(Nc).
3. If ∆x(N) > c and ∆x(N) ≥ Nc, all agents working is implementable
for all β ≥ 0.
Proposition 3.4 follows directly from Proposition 3.2 and 3.3 with ∆ y(K) = ∆x(k). It has
the following implications. First, if all agents working is not efficient, it is not implementable.
Thus, inequity aversion can never support inefficiently large firms. Second, inequity aversion
facilitates cooperation. If all agents working is implementable in case agents are not inequity
averse, it is implementable if agents are inequity averse. Moreover, there exist situations in
which all agents working is implementable if and only if agents are inequity averse. Thirdly,
the minimum level of inequity aversion required to sustain cooperation increases with the size
N of the firm if ∆x(N)/N then decreases. The present paper therefore can explain why in re-
ality small partnerships often work well whereas larger ones frequently suffer from free-riding.
The reason for exerting effort depends on the agents’ degree of inequity aversion. If agents
are highly inequity averse, β ≥ (N − 1)/N , they anticipate renegotiation and thus have an
incentive to maximize joint surplus. If agents are not highly inequity averse, β < (N − 1)/N ,
they know that there will be no renegotiation. They are thus not interested in the joint
surplus. Yet if an inequity averse agent shirks whereas all other agents work, she incurs a
utility loss from being better off than all other agents. If this ‘shame for cheating’ outweighs
the - potential - increase in her rent, the agent abstains from shirking. Putting it differently,
inequity averse agents overcome the team production problem if ‘compassion’ or ‘shame
for cheating’ is large enough. It is this behavioral trait of ‘feeling bad’ when cheating the
others that creates incentives to exert effort. In contrast a selfish agent does not bear these
behavioral costs, which makes cooperation more difficult to sustain.
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3.4.2 Inequity Aversion and the Optimal Firm Size
Contrary to the positive impact on incentives, inequity aversion can prevent employment of
an additional agent even if this is efficient and causes no incentive problems absent inequity
aversion. In the following numerical example consider a firm consisting of two agents, agent
1 and 2. If both agents exert effort, they each incur effort costs c = 1 but produce joint
output x(2) = 10. Suppose both divide revenue evenly, and that both agents working forms
a Nash equilibrium. Thus, both get a rent of 4 if firm size is 2. However, the firm has the
opportunity to expand and employ an agent 3. If all three agents work, output increases to
x(3) = 13. Agent 3 has effort costs c = 1. As the increase of 3 in joint output exceeds the
effort costs of 1 it is efficient to expand and employ the agent.
Employing the agent causes no incentive problems if there is no inequity aversion. Suppose
no agent is inequity averse and agent 3 is employed. Consider the following contract. If all
agents work, agent 1 and 2 receive a monetary payoff of 6 whereas the newly employed agent
3 receives a monetary payoff of 1. If only two agents work, agent 1 and 2 receive a monetary
payoff of 5 whereas agent 3 receives no monetary payoff. This contract is budget-balancing.
Further, if all agents work, agent 1 and 2 get a rent of 5 whereas agent 3 is just compensated
for her effort costs. If either agent 1 or 2 shirks, the shirking agent receives a rent of 5. If
agent 3 shirks, she receives a rent of zero. Thus, all agents working forms a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, agent 1 and 2 get a rent of 5 which exceeds the rent of 4 if agent 3 is not employed.
The firm expands.
However, the incumbent owners of the firm might decide not to expand if they are inequity
averse. Suppose all agents are highly inequity averse, β ≥ 2/3. All agents then know that
they will renegotiate and divide joint surplus evenly. All agents working forms a Nash equi-
librium and all agents, including agent 3, get the same rent of 10/3. As this is less than the
rent of 4 which agent 1 and 2 get on their own, agent 3 is not employed.
But even if the agents are not highly inequity averse, the firm might decide not to expand. As
she then suffers from rent inequality, agent 3 does not accept work if she receives a monetary
payoff of 1 in case all agents work. This holds for all positive levels of inequity aversion. But
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if agent 3 has to be given more than 1, agent 1 and 2 must receive less than 6 if all agents
work. Depending on their degree of inequity aversion all agents working might no longer
form a Nash equilibrium although inequity aversion facilitates cooperation. Summarizing, if
agents are inequity averse but no highly inequity averse, the above problem - although less
severe - might still exist.
If firms are predominantly viewed as a place of team production, the present paper might
provide fresh insights into the labor market. Suppose there exists only a limited number of
production opportunities and thus firms within an economy. Cooperation amongst the own-
ers of a firm becomes more difficult with increasing size of the team. Proposition 3.4 implies
that either the conditions on β for a given production technology increase, or equivalently
the conditions on the production technology become more stringent for a given β. For either
interpretation, including another individual causes incentive problems so that individuals
might not find a job although joint surplus increases if they are employed.
Inequity aversion has an ambiguous impact on the situation. First, incentive provision is
facilitated thus reducing the negative impact of incomplete information on firm size and em-
ployment. Second, inequity aversion causes the incumbent owners of a firm additional costs.
Depending on the degree of inequity aversion either a new-employed partner has to be given
an income exceeding her effort costs or renegotiation directly results in a new distribution of
the joint surplus. Inequity aversion might thus aggravate the situation on the labor market.
Note that the interaction of incentive problems, inequity aversion and team size is determined
by contracts. Thus, the above conclusions can only be drawn by referring to our results in
the previous section.
3.4.3 Multiple Equilibria
If agents are highly inequity averse, β ≥ (N − 1)/N , initial contracts are renegotiated so
that all agents receive the same rent. As this is anticipated each agent has incentives to lo-
cally maximize joint surplus. Thus, K agents working forms a Nash equilibrium if and only if
x(K−1)−(K−1) c ≤ x(K)−Kc and x(K)−Kc ≤ x(K+1)−(K+1) c. Whether there exist
multiple Nash equilibria depends on the production technology. If there are several equilibria,
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some of them are undesirable because they do not maximize joint surplus. Contrary to the
multiple equilibria in Huck, Kübler, and Weibull (2003) agents do not ‘coordinate’ on these
equilibria with low aggregate effort in order to synchronize their actions as such. Instead
agents might end up in these undesirable Nash equilibria as their effort choice is optimal
given the effort choices of the other agents.
However, if agents are not highly inequity averse, β < (N − 1)/N , contracts determine in-
centives and can thus be designed to destroy multiple Nash equilibria. We say a contract
uniquely implements all agents working if all agents working forms the unique Nash equilib-
rium. For any degree of inequity aversion there is the following result for a particulary simple
production technology.
Proposition 3.5 Consider a worker-owned firm of size N with x(K) = K for all K ∈
{0, 1, ..., N}, and suppose agents have effort costs c < 1. If N ≥ 4, there exists a contract S
that uniquely implements all agents working if and only if β > (Nc− 1)/(Nc).
Proof: If β ≥ (N − 1)/N , all agents working forms the unique Nash equilibrium as K = N
maximizes K −K c subject to K ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}.
If β < (Nc− 1)/(Nc), there exists no contract that implements all agents working by Propo-
sition 3.3. Thus, there cannot exist a contract that uniquely implements all agents working.
For the remainder of the proof assume (Nc − 1)/(Nc) < β < (N − 1)/N . Consider the
following contract S. First, S is budget-balancing and equal at the top, si(N) = sj(N) = 1
and si(N − 1) = sj(N − 1) = (N − 1)/N for all i, j ∈ N . Second, s1(x) = 1 and si(x) = 0
for all i 6= 1 if x is even, and s2(x) = 1 and si(x) = 0 for all i 6= 2 if x is uneven. In words,
if more than one agent shirks, the entire output is given to agent 1 if the number of working
agents is even or zero, and to agent 2 otherwise.
Since the contract is equal at the top all agents working forms a Nash equilibrium according
to Proposition 3.3. Below we show that this Nash equilibrium is unique.
First, suppose all but one agent work and output is x = N − 1. Given β = (Nc − 1)/(Nc)
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all agents working forms a Nash equilibrium where all agents are exactly indifferent between
working and shirking if all other agents work. In this case all but one agent working might
also form a Nash equilibrium. However, if β > (Nc− 1)/(Nc) each agent strictly prefers to
work if all the other agents work. As we consider the latter case, all but one agent working
cannot form a Nash equilibrium.
Next, suppose at least two but not more than N − 2 agents work so that output is x ∈
{2, .., N − 2}. In this case there are at least two agents exerting effort, only one agent
receiving the entire output, and N − x agents shirking. Call the agent who works but does
not receive any monetary reward agent i. Her utility is given by
vi(〈1, e−i〉, S) = −c− α
[
1
N − 1 x +
N − x
N − 1 c
]
.
If agent i shirks, there are x − 1 agents left working. Agent i’s utility then depends on
S(x − 1). There are three cases. First, suppose agent i receives the entire output when
shirking, si(x−1) = x−1. Apart form agent i, there are now N−x agents shirking and x−1
agents working. None of them receives a monetary payoff. Thus, agent i’s utility is given by
vi(〈0, e−i〉, S) = (x− 1)− β
[
N − x
N − 1 (x− 1) +
x− 1
N − 1(x− 1 + c)
]
.
Second, suppose agent j ∈ {1, 2} other than agent i receives the output x−1. Suppose agent
j works. In addition to agent j, there are now x− 2 agents working. Agent i, as all the other
agents apart form agent j, receives no monetary payoff. Thus, her utility is given by
vi(〈0, e−i〉, S) = −α
[
1
N − 1(x− 1− c)
]
− β
[
x− 2
N − 1 c
]
.
Thirdly, suppose agent j ∈ {1, 2} other than agent i receives the output x − 1, and agent j
shirks. There are now x−1 agents working. Agent i, as all the other agents apart form agent
j, receives no monetary payoff. Thus, her utility is given by
vi(〈0, e−i〉, S) = −α
[
1
N − 1(x− 1)
]
− β
[
x− 1
N − 1 c
]
.
Comparison of the above three terms yields that agent i receives the minimum utility when
shirking if the now reduced output x − 1 is given to another agent who herself is shirking.
However, even in this worst case agent i’s utility when shirking exceeds her utility when
working as long as
c
[
1− β x− 1
N − 1 + α
N − x
N − 1
]
+ α
1
N − 1 > 0.
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This is satisfied as N > x and β < 1. Thus, x ∈ {2, .., N − 2} agents working cannot form a
Nash equilibrium.
Next, suppose only one agent works so that output is x = 1. As N ≥ 4 there are less than
N − 1 agents working. Thus, the entire output is given to agent 2. There are two cases.
First, suppose agent i 6= 2 works. Her utility is then given by
vi = −c− α
[
N − 1
N − 1 c−
1
N − 1
]
< 0.
If agent i shirks, all agents including agent i herself receive a utility of zero. Thus, agent
i prefers to shirk. Second, suppose agent 2 works. Consider agent 1, who then receives a
utility of
v1 = −α
[
1
N − 1(1− c)
]
< 0.
Suppose agent 1 works. As N ≥ 4, there are less than N − 1 agents working and agent 1
receives a monetary payoff of 2. Thus, agent 1’s utility is given by
v1 = 2− c− β
[
N − 2
N − 1(2− c) +
1
N − 1 2
]
,
which is larger than zero as β < (N − 1)/(N). Thus, agent 1 prefers to work. Consequently,
one agent working cannot form a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, suppose no agent works. Then agent 2, as all the other agents, receives a utility of
v2 = 0. Suppose agent 2 works. As N ≥ 4, she then receives the entire output, x = 1. Thus,
her utility when working is given by
v2 = 1− c− β
[
N − 1
N − 1(1− c)
]
> 0
as β < 1. Thus, no agent working cannot form a Nash equilibrium. Summarizing, all agents
working is the unique Nash equilibrium given contract S. Q.E.D.
As ∆x(K) = 1 < c for all K it is always efficient if all agents work, and all agents working is
the unique maximizer of the joint surplus for any firm size N . If agents are highly inequity
averse, β ≥ (N −1)/N , all agents working thus forms the unique Nash equilibrium by Propo-
sition 3.2.
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Suppose now that agents are not highly inequity averse, β < (N−1)/N . Consider the follow-
ing contract. “In case all or all but one agent work, output is equally distributed. Otherwise,
if an even number of agents or nobody works, the entire output is given to, say, agent 1.
If an uneven number of agents works then all is given to another agent, say, agent 2.” By
Proposition 3.3 all agents working forms a Nash equilibrium. As the condition on β is given
by the strict inequality this Nash equilibrium is strict and all but one agent working cannot
form a Nash equilibrium. Consider now all other candidate equilibria in turn. All agents
shirking cannot be an equilibrium. In this case agent 2 has an incentive to work as she then
receives the entire output. Only one agent working cannot be an equilibrium either. If in this
case agent 2 is working, now agent 1 has an incentive to work as she then receives the entire
output. If in this case agent 2 is not working, the working agent incurs effort costs but does
not receive a monetary payoff. Hence, she gets a higher utility by shirking and deviates. In
all other cases at least one agent works but does not receive a monetary payoff. This agent
is better off shirking.
Unfortunately, the above contract may not work for firm sizes smaller than four. If agents are
not highly inequity averse, a contract implementing all agents working must give all agents
relatively equal monetary payoffs in case all agents or all but one agent work. If firm size
is less than four, this imposes restrictions on the vector of monetary payoffs in case two or
one agent work. Consider the following example with N = 2, x(K) = K, and effort costs
strictly larger but very close to 1/2. If the contract is equal at the top, both agents receive
a monetary payoff of 1/2 if one agent works and the other agent shirks. In this case the
working agent receives a rent of 1/2 − c. As this is smaller than zero no agent working
forms a Nash equilibrium. In order to uniquely implement all agents working the contract
has to be made ‘less equal at the top’. This has two effects. One the one hand, minimum
incentives to work are impaired so that at least one agent has reduced incentives to work.
On the other hand, abandoning the contractual restriction of equality at the top might make
unique implementation possible. For the above example consider the following contract with
s1(0) = s2(0) = 0, s1(1) = 2/3, s2(1) = 1/3 and s1(2) = s2(2) = 1. It is then possible to
show that for effort costs strictly larger but very close to 1/2 there exist levels of inequity
aversion α < (2 − 3c)/(3c − 1) and β > (3c − 1)/(3c + 1) with α > β so that both agents
working forms the unique Nash equilibrium. The condition on β is more restrictive than the
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condition imposed in Proposition 3.3, but the minimum β is smaller than (N − 1)/N = 1/2.
Thus, it is sometimes possible to uniquely implement all agents working although agents are
not sufficiently inequity averse to prompt renegotiation. If inequity aversion is sufficiently
high, the additional restriction imposed by unique implementation might be no problem.
But the less inequity averse the agents, the more detrimental are the restrictions imposed
on the contract at the top. Therefore, for some parameter constellations all agents working
can never be uniquely implemented in firms comprising less than four agents although it is
implementable.
3.5 Teams and Outside Ownership
Teams are often used in firms with outside ownership. This section analyzes the impact of
inequity aversion on a firm’s decision to form teams. Including a principal does not change
the general implications of inequity aversion on incentive provision. The following proposition
summarizes the conditions allowing a principal to implement all agents working in a team
of size N . Note that in addition to Condition 3.1 contracts are now required to satisfy
Condition 3.2.
Proposition 3.6 Consider a team of size N .
1. If β ≥ (N − 1)/N , the principal can implement all agents working
if and only if ∆x(N) ≥ c.
2. If β < (N − 1)/N , the principal can implement all agents working
if and only if ∆x(N) ≥ (1− β) N c.
The costs of implementing all agents working are y(N) = N c.
Consider an optimal contract implementing all agents working in a team of given size N . First,
Proposition 3.1 implies that the contract can be taken to be equal at the top, si(N) = sj(N)
and si(N − 1) = sj(N − 1) for all i, j ∈ N .
Second, all agents are just compensated for their effort costs in case all agents work. Thus,
si(N) = c for all i ∈ N and y(N) = N c. As in equilibrium all agents work they just accept
the contract. The principal cannot lower these minimum monetary payoffs without forfeiting
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participation. Moreover, individual incentives are determined by the change si(N)−si(N−1)
in monetary payoffs and not by the absolute magnitude of si(N). Thus increasing si(N) is
not necessary to improve incentives as long as si(N − 1) may be lowered.
Thirdly, since the contract is equal at the top Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 may be applied. Thus,
incentive provision imposes a lower bound on ∆ y(N). For given y(N) = N c, this implies an
upper bound on y(N − 1). Finally, Condition 3.2 imposes an upper bound on ∆ y(N). For
given y(N) = N c, this implies a lower bound on y(N −1). Whenever the last two conditions
on ∆ y(N) or equivalently y(N−1) are compatible, the principal can give the right incentives
for all agents to work while at the same time keeping the contract bribery-proof and thus
credible. This implies Proposition 3.6.
Inequity aversion thus simplifies incentive provision for the principal. For a given production
technology x, the optimal team - or firm - size is determined by
max
N∈Γ
x(N)−N c,
where Γ is the set of team sizes N so that the relevant condition on ∆ x(N) in Proposi-
tion 3.6 is satisfied. The principal can extract all rents from the agents and maximizes joint
surplus. As all the employed agents get zero rent an additional agent accepts work if she is
just compensated for her effort costs. Thus, the negative impact of inequity aversion on firm
size vanishes with the introduction of a principal.
The analysis of the interaction between inequity aversion and team incentives might provide
interesting insights into the organization of firms. Splitting the workforce in different divi-
sions might have an impact on the workers’ reference groups. This can generate positive or
negative incentive effects. Finally, note that different organizational forms can almost always
be observed within a single firm. Consultancies and law firms have on the one hand a strong
horizontal team orientation but on the other hand relatively strict - informal - vertical hi-
erarchies. One could argue that this might allow the co-existence of teams and individual
workers outside of teams.
97
3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Agents Comparing only Monetary Payoffs
The theory of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) explains the seemingly contra-
dictory empirical evidence of a large number of experiments. In these cases agents’ reference
groups and criteria of comparison are essentially defined by the experimental setting. In more
natural environments these points are no longer clear. When applying the theory of inequity
aversion to team production it seems plausible that the other agents form the group of ref-
erence. We also find it compelling that people take the other team members’ effort decisions
into account, and this is indeed mandatory to capture the notion of ‘shame for cheating’. We
thus have assumed throughout the paper that agents compare rents amongst each other.
Notwithstanding suppose that agents compare monetary payoffs only. If the contract is equal
in case all agents or all but one agent work, an agent does not suffer from inequity if he alone
shirks. Incentives are then not affected by inequity aversion. Could they be improved by a
contract that gives one or several agents higher and the other agents lower monetary payoffs in
case one agent shirks? This surely enhances incentives for those agents getting a lower payoff,
but how about those agents getting more? If these agents are not very inequity averse and
their utility is rising in their monetary payoff, their incentives to work are reduced. If agents
are homogeneous, minimum incentives over all agents are thus impaired. However, if the
agents are very inequity averse and their utility is decreasing in their monetary payoff, there
will be renegotiation until all agents share joint production equally. Anticipating this any
initial contract boils down to an ex post equal contract, and agents have the same incentives to
shirk as if there was no inequity aversion. Thus, inequity aversion cannot improve incentives
in teams if agents compare monetary payoffs only.
3.6.2 Agents with Heterogeneous Preferences
In this model all agents are taken to have identical preferences, yet in reality agents probably
differ with respect to their concerns for inequity. This would probably have the following
consequences. If preferences are observable, the more inequity averse agents can be granted
a relatively large fraction of the output in case one agent shirks. As these agents suffer a lot
from cheating they do not shirk. The other, less inequity averse agents can then be assigned a
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low fraction of output in case one agent shirks. This prevents them from shirking even if they
do not suffer heavily from social comparisons. Thus, incentive provision may be facilitated
with the help of unequal contracts.
If the agents’ preferences are unobservable, differentiating between agents with different con-
cerns for inequity is not feasible. This generates a tendency towards more equal contracts.
However, it might now be possible and desirable to screen agents according to their prefer-
ences. This opens a whole range of new and interesting questions.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper shows how incentive provision in team production is affected if agents are inequity
averse in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Optimal contracts accounting for inequity
aversion involve simple, budget-balancing, and equal sharing rules. Moreover, inequity aver-
sion can provide all agents with sufficient incentives to work in cases where this is unfeasible
with agents only caring for their own monetary payoff and effort costs. Our results are
driven by the assumption that agents incorporate effort costs in their comparisons. ‘Shame
from cheating’ reduces a shirking agent’s utility precisely in those cases in which she actually
shirks. As contracts cannot condition on an agent’s effort decision, they cannot afflict the
above ‘intrinsic punishment’ with equal precision. Thus, inequity aversion facilitates incentive
provision. Furthermore, the conditions under which inequity aversion permits cooperation
amongst the agents depend on the size of the team. They usually become less restrictive with
decreasing size of the team, which fits the common observation that small teams often work
well whereas larger ones suffer from free-riding. Summarizing, the present paper shows that
inequity aversion and the associated incentive effects could offer a fruitful new perspective
on the internal organization of firms if these can influence its workers’ references groups.
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Güth, W., R. Schmittberger, and R. Tietz (1990): “Ultimatum Bargaining Behaviour
- A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results,” Journal of Economic Psychology,
11, 417–449.
102
Hart, O., and J. Moore (1990): “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal
of Political Economy, 98, 1119–1158.
Holmström, B. (1982): “Moral Hazard in Teams,” Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 324–340.
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